SHIFTING LITTORAL FRONTIERS OF EUROAFRICAN AND AFRICAN TRADE IN THE NORTHERN RIVERS OF SIERRA LEONE, 1794: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FROM CHANGING CONDITIONS.

Abstract: In 1794, James Watt, as agent of the Sierra Leone Company, travelled from Freetown to Timbo, capital of the Fula Empire in the Futa Jalon of modern Guinea. This report reviews the dynamics present in coastal trade in 1793/94 and summarizes company objectives to establish cordial relations with political and economic elites in Fula country. The report also looks critically at the EuroAfrican and African dimension to events in 1793/94, the challenges which the company initiative presented to these other elites, and the opportunities which coastal and Fula elites seized or lost in consequence of Watt's expedition. This research suggests that the resultant shifts in trading frontiers came as much from African opportunism as from British planning.
The 1794 expedition to Timbo, capital of the Fula Empire, by agents of the Sierra Leone Company came as a result of events and circumstances on the Windward Coast which had been building over the preceding four years and involved a number of players. The Sierra Leone Company, a relatively recent entry to the coast, had political and commercial objectives which had become stalled by events beyond its control. Long-term resident traders and those who acted as independents on this coast had problems of their own, adjusting to a new European war which interfered with normal commerce and to competition from the Sierra Leone Company and its agents, and struggling to maintain marginal positions relative to local political elites and growing African competition in trade. The Africans, whether local or long-distant from the coast, were also players in this drama, for events on the coast disrupted their traditional markets and interfered with their access to manufactures, cola, and salt. All parties were profoundly effected by the drama that occurred between January and May of 1794.

The most crucial of these actors was the Sierra Leone Company which put the expedition into motion in 1794. Between 1791, the year in which Parliament incorporated the Sierra Leone venture, and late 1793, the company's fortunes and vision at Freetown fluctuated dramatically. Its objectives in 1791 were clear, to
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spread Christianity from its post on the coast and to oppose the slave trade.¹ But the charter granted the company neither territory nor a monopoly of trade at Sierra Leone, leaving slavers free access to the river and the company’s settlement at Freetown.² The directors expected the company to expand its commerce into the river’s hinterland, to wholesale trade goods to neighboring merchants, and to grow cash crops, such as sugar, cotton, tobacco, coffee, pineapples, pepper, coconuts, and rice. These in turn could be exported to England or would sustain and make the settlement self-sufficient. This latter objective, it was believed, would encourage neighboring peoples to sell their labor and the result of labor rather than their slaves to the world market.³

Circumstances, however, changed dramatically with the appointment of John Clarkson as director of the enterprise at Sierra Leone and the arrival of approximately 1200 liberated AfroAmericans from Nova Scotia in Canada in March 1792. Clarkson declared the company’s objectives of expanding trade into the interior to be premature and turned its attention instead to the cultivation of crops to make the settlement self-sufficient, an "agricultural Mecca" of sorts.⁴ Only when the problems of rents and distribution of lands to the settlers had been solved would he be willing to return to the company’s larger task of developing a coastal and river trade, or of teaching Africans good commercial habits which were both morally and ethically
While Clarkson frittered away his time and energies trying to control and feed the Nova Scotians, and fulfill promises made to them before they left Canada, the company's directors in England were discussing other issues, such as securing a profitable return on their L235,000 investment made in 1791.6 The company wanted a quick return on its investment, either in the form of cash crops or of extended linkages to trading systems in the interior. To do this, Clarkson needed assistants to help him control the Nova Scotians, but the company sent estate managers, most of whom had obtained experience operating plantations or business ventures in the Caribbean.7 In August 1792, Clarkson became governor, to be assisted by William Dawes, who had been a low ranked officer of marines at Botany Bay, and Zachary Macaulay, who combined a commercial acumen learned in Jamaica with devotion to the anti-slave trade zeal of the company's directors.8 With leadership as disparate as this, the company's venture appeared to be increasingly at risk.

Adding to these difficulties which resulted from conflicting objectives between Clarkson and the company directors were other problems which continued beyond the company's ability to control. The presence of slave traders who operated trading factories within a few miles of the company's settlement at Freetown in 1792 continued to thwart the company's vision of legitimate
commerce and its future dominance in that trade. In the main branch of the Sierra Leone River was John Tilley’s factory on Bance Island. Bance had only one small town, Adam’s town, a few houses and a cemetery. This was the principal center of slaving activity above Freetown on the river. Any slaver visiting its factory or leaving it would necessarily need to pass Freetown on its way to the sea, tempting Nova Scotians to join trades known to be successful on the coast.

Closer to Freetown was a prosperous French operated factory on Gambia Island, administered by Dr. Renneau. Both Renneau and Tilley were connected to larger trading concerns in Britain or France and both enjoyed the protection of trade which these connections guaranteed. Had the Nova Scotians taken willingly to farming or local productions, the company’s problems with the settlers and with Tilley and Renneau might have been minimal. That was not, however, to be; instead, settlers saw their future more securely tied to the river’s commerce and to trade elsewhere along the coast. Consequently, the company found it increasingly difficult to keep watch over its Nova Scotian charges and to generate food stuffs and cash crops sufficient to make the settlement self-sustaining.

William Dawes and indirectly his deputy Zachary Macaulay were directed to revitalize the settlement and return the company to its former purpose in coastal commerce: sell wholesale goods to
local traders, produce cash crops which would replace slave trading as the principal avenue of capital accumulation, and make the settlement self-sufficient. This new turn effectively revived the expansionist vision of the company and brought it into potential conflict with other forces on the coast. Dawes attempted to extend plantation agriculture on Bullom Shore and upon islands in the Sierra Leone estuary, following the lead of slave traders who were actively growing cotton, sugar cane, tobacco, and rice on several of the neighboring islands.\textsuperscript{14}

Wholesaling manufactures to neighboring traders was a good idea, if they could be obtained. Rumors of possible warfare between Britain and revolutionary France circulated increasingly, and with fewer American vessels visiting the coast, the supplies of trade goods became scarce. Increasingly the company found it necessary to spend much of its trade capital to purchase the very necessities of rice and cattle which kept the settlement alive and under control. The prospects of expanding trade connections into the African interior brightened, however, with the Houghton report to the African Association in 1792 and with the arrival in Freetown of an Islamic teacher from Port Loko who invited the company to establish commercial contact with interior states along international paths which crossed his territory.\textsuperscript{15}

The declaration of war against Britain by revolutionary France on 1 February 1793 increased the strains then present at
Sierra Leone. John Clarkson had anticipated such a war and had written to Lafayette in July 1792, asking him to use his influence to observe Sierra Leone Company neutrality should war commence. Indeed, the two Clarksons, John and his brother Thomas, were recognized as friendly to the French revolution and to its ideas. British and French trade along the west coast shrunk late in 1792, with shippers reluctant to risk the loss of a cargo to privateers who would look for an excuse to seize vessels as booty of war. For the moment, Freetown was secure, but declining trade goods meant that the settlement would not be resupplied and might need to expend additional capital goods to maintain the settlement. Cattle sources from the Gambia River were now gone as well.

The outbreak of war early in 1793 also produced new stresses upon neighboring slave traders who rejected neutrality, seeking instead to expand their influence. Dr. Renneau on Gambia Island understood well his precarious position in the river, surrounded as he was by British subjects, some of whom, like John Tilley, had reason to settle old scores with him. Renneau appealed to company protection, claiming a neutral stand in the Franco-British war. Indeed, the company looked closely at Gambia island as an area for potential purchase. Tilley was reluctant to raid Renneau's property in the river, but others were not so disinclined. In June 1793, one of Renneau's vessels was seized by a British privateer and its cargo and several of Renneau's slave
properties and grumettes (free black laborers) were sold at Bance Island. Renneau's war vessels seized the privateer who had sold Renneau's property, took the privateer to Gambia Island, and sent word to Freetown to have the company mediate his war with Tilley and the privateer. Tilley meanwhile prepared to attack Gambia. Renneau now proposed to place his factory under Sierra Leone Company protection and to give up slave trading, in return for neutrality in the war.\textsuperscript{23} Dawes, who by this time had replaced Clarkson as governor, replied that the company could not risk its neutrality in the larger conflict by taking possession of French property and instead asked that both the company and Renneau reaffirm their neutralities in the war by signing an agreement to that effect.\textsuperscript{24}

Tilley claimed no such neutrality, however, and his struggle with Renneau continued to fester. By late July, both Tilley and Renneau, or their agents, reported regularly to Dawes and Macaulay the despicable activities of the other, always requesting that the company take sides in their continuing contest for economic preeminence.\textsuperscript{25} In August, Renneau escalated his debate with Tilley by seizing a British slave ship, then releasing it to the company as a gesture of good will, while at the same time threatening to destroy Bance Island. Tilley now demanded that the company join him for a joint strike against Gambia; the company refused.\textsuperscript{26} In September, Zachary Macaulay, deputy governor to Dawes, met with Renneau who proposed to leave
Gambia within six weeks and to give the island to the company. Macaulay listened to the particulars of the dispute, but resolved nothing.  

The failure by either Macaulay or Dawes to resolve the continuing dispute between Tilley and Renneau had only part to do with the company's desire to remain neutral in the Franco-British war of 1793. Another dimension to the Tilley/Renneau/company discussion, however, was the possibility of a new source of cattle and rice which might bypass Tilley and his subfactor at Port Loko as principal providers of these supplies for the settlement. In November 1792, an Islamic teacher from Port Loko had visited Freetown and described the potential of a future international path between the Fula Empire and Freetown, via Port Loko and the Scarcies.  

In September 1793, the chief of Port Loko visited Renneau's factory at Gambia where he indicated his interest in sending one or more of his own children to Freetown for an education and reported that the ruler of the Fula was interested in abolishing the slave trade. The ruler of Port Loko further invited the company to open its own factory in his town which would free him from reliance upon Tilley's agent who operated a factory there. For the company, this new suggestion placed again on its agenda its ultimate objective of expanding trade into neighboring rivers and into linkages with interior systems. To Tilley, this proposal elevated the stakes considerably in his struggle with Renneau, raising the
possibility that his share of trade between the settlement and the interior might be lost altogether. Tilley was now on the defensive.

By September 1793, Zachary Macaulay and his vision of an expanded commercial network connecting the company and its agents to trade in coastal rivers, hinterland towns, and perhaps at Timbo or further beyond, was becoming formalized at Freetown. Since his arrival in the settlement, Macaulay had taken charge of providing the AfroAmerican settlers with food and supplies, often at inflated prices, and had been willing to trade with slave traders to succeed in this task. This bothered Maria Falconbridge who described Macaulay as being too friendly with slavers, a price she considered to be too costly for commercial success along the coast.\textsuperscript{30} Macaulay's plan was multifaceted. Macaulay planned to position company agents at factories at Port Loko and in the Rio Pongo further to the north, to resolve long lasting differences between Iles de Los slave traders and the settlement, and to send the company's best negotiator directly to the Fula Empire to arrange an agreement between the company and distant suppliers of rice and cattle.\textsuperscript{31}

The first of these objectives, to establish factories at Port Loko and in the Rio Pongo, was already in the planning stages before the end of 1793. Port Loko was midway along an insecure path between Freetown and Timbo and crossed the territory of
several groups who might oppose an international path, with armed
Fula warriors escorting traders and their cargos to the coast. A
factory at Port Loko also would endanger Tilley's commerce in the
settlement's hinterland and might interfere with
Mandingo/Mandinka trade in salt and cola between Moria and
interior trading systems. Slave rebellions along the
Guinea/Scarcies corridor had rocked the area not long before, and
Fula as well as Morian elites might wonder about the impact of an
international path on the uneasy calm which had come to the
area. The Mande state of Moria, with its capital at Forecariah
and ruled by Alimami Setafa, had consolidated its influence in
the Melacori and Forecariah rivers a few years earlier, and
political and commercial elites there were beginning to consider
the company and its settlement at Freetown as an opportunity for
trade in rice, hides, and cattle and perhaps also as an adversary
in trade north of the British settlement.

Not far from Moria and its Susu sister state of Sumbuya were
the Iles de Los which had long served as important stations for
European shippers in need of supplies, cargo, repair, or
convalescence. The arrival of the Sierra Leone Company in 1791,
as a strong advocate of the anti-slave trade, produced a dilemma
of sorts for H. Jackson and Richard Horrock who were the
principal slave traders resident on the islands. Despite the
contradictions of trading with slavers, the company needed
Jackson and Horrock, among other slavers, to provide them with
goods from American shippers frequenting the coast, and for the rice and cattle that often came from open paths at the Rio Pongo or the Rio Nunez. \(^{35}\) John Ormond, the most powerful and notorious slave trader in the Rio Pongo, was one of many slave traders who visited the islands often and it was while convalescing on these islands in 1791 that Ormond died. \(^{36}\) His death and resulting revolt by a large number of his slaves threw the Rio Pongo into such political and economic confusion that trade did not recover there for nearly two years.

John Clarkson's policy that any slave or grumetta who sought the sanctuary of Freetown from his owner would be given company protection was the principal source of conflict between the Iles de Los traders and the settlement. \(^{37}\) This policy had caused problems for the company with many traders, chiefs, and even ship captains along the coast, but the most serious difference occurred in August 1793 when five grumettas belonging to Horrock and Jackson, after delivering trade goods to Freetown, refused to return to the Iles de Los and requested protection from the company. \(^{38}\) Later the grumettas explained that they had heard that Horrock was planning to retire because of the depressed market which resulted from the Franco-British war and that he was planning to sell them at the earliest opportunity to an America-bound slaver. \(^{39}\) Both Horrock and Jackson demanded the return of their property (grumettas), and Macaulay, to whom responsibility fell for resolution of this dispute, complained
bitterly of the mess that Clarkson's policy had left the company. Macaulay needed the support and friendship of slavers and slave shippers, not anxiety that their property might find asylum in the settlement. Macaulay also needed the good will of chiefs to the north of Freetown, chiefs who only recently had suppressed several slave rebellions in their midst. Horrock's death in 1793 did nothing to resolve the problem, and the asylum issue, while anathema to the success of the company, continued to plague the company and the colony of Sierra Leone for years to come.

The other part of Macaulay's plan was to establish a factory in the Rio Pongo and to send his best negotiator to Timbo in the Futa Jalon. The Rio Pongo and the Rio Nunez to the north of it were centers of coastal trade to more than a dozen American, European, EuroAfrican and African traders located in the grasslands above the mangrove shore lines. These centers of trade, located at points where captains could anchor their vessels, served as terminuses of long distance trade between the Futa Jalon and the coast. Goods which came coastward from the interior included rice, hides, ivory, gum, some gold, and of course the bearers of these goods, the surplus slaves who would not be needed on the return trip into the interior. The paths connecting the Rio Pongo to the interior commenced at Labe to the North and Timbo to the South, and came together into a single path not too distant from the coast itself. The southern path
was less secure than the northern one, partly because of the slave rebellions which had characterized the Guinea/Scarcies corridor after mid-century. The northern path was outside Timbo control. The principal traders in the Rio Pongo were of mixed Portuguese and Baga descent, a few Susu traders who took advantage from the presence of Europeans to provision slavers with rice and supplies needed in the middle passage, and European or American traders and their offspring who dominated commerce in the river. John Ormond had been one of this group before his death in 1791, acting as a chief in his own right and serving as the Fula sanctioned merchant in the river. Ormond had maintained a representative at Timbo to look after his interest in the interior and to keep him attuned to political changes which would affect political and commercial conditions on the coast.45

The Rio Nunez was clearly the more secure trading area for Europeans, partly because of the easy and wide estuary, and the absence of reefs or sandbars that could surprise the unwary ship captain.46 Most captains hired a pilot at the Iles de Los to guide them into the river and to the spot nearly thirty miles upstream where the grasslands began, where large numbers of Fula came with goods to trade, and where several long established Europeans and EuroAfrican maintained factories. One could expect to find goods waiting to be bought and a ready market for any goods that one brought for sale. One could also expect hospitality, a chance to walk from factory to factory, visiting
and catching up on news of the coast. The food and drink were good, and if one avoided the rainy season, the healthiness of the air was wonderful. Indeed, one of the factories was called "Bel-aire." The African landlords who owned the land here, the Nalous and the Landumans, were poorly organized to regulate either trade or the Europeans or to oppose the Fula traders who came by the hundreds into their territories. The Fula considered the paths which connected these factories to the interior as belonging to them and the landlords on the coast as their lowly and as-yet-unconverted subjects. As in the Pongo, the relationship of the Fula to the coastal rulers was that of ruler to subject, or upper to lower, and that would not change for the next half-century.

Sierra Leone Company interest in passing through the Nunez factories on their way into the Futa Jalon early in 1794 produced a dilemma for Nunez traders. The quantity of trade goods available for sale to Fula caravans at coastal factories had fallen drastically in consequence of the Franco-British war and for a time in 1793 Fula caravans dwindled during a period of political turmoil in the interior. By early 1794, however, Fula caravans arrived in large numbers with rice, ivory, and hides. The market for slaves had declined significantly as well with the reduced visits by French and British traders and with the decision by revolutionary France to declare slavery illegal in French territory. Prices for slaves plummeted and the large
quantities of rice coming coastward had few buyers, for rice comprised the principal food provided to slaves while aboard ship or during the middle passage.51 The company might be purchasing rice and cattle for its own consumption, but traders in the Nunez were uncertain. Macaulay was proposing an expedition through the Nunez, not a factory or company agent to be stationed there. The proposed expedition also presented an opportunity for Nunez traders to send their agents to Labe and Timbo and to watch the activities of the company and report back to their superiors in the Nunez what the company was planning to do there. David Lawrence, a EuroAfrican factor at Kissassi on the Nunez, provided two guides to the expedition, and Mr. Fortune of Boke and James Walker of Walkaria (Kocundy) likewise offered the services of loyal servants to assist the expedition and keep them apprised of events in the interior.52

Whether the Fula had actually invited the company to come to Timbo is unclear in the sources. Perhaps events just transpired and the company assumed that there had actually been an invitation tendered. In any case, Dawes and Macaulay carefully planned the expedition and executed it between January and June in 1794. The leader of the expedition would be James Watt, director of Clarkson Plantation on Bullom Shore and a superb negotiator who had learned to deal with several landlords in the neighborhood of Freetown.53 Watt had worked as an "overseer" in Dominica in the West Indies and had arrived in Sierra Leone in
1791 with the expressed task of creating plantations and producing crops in cotton, sugar cane, tobacco, coffee and rice which would either sustain the settlement or be sold for cash. Macaulay called Watt "a man of cultivation and energy." It is clear from Watt's journal that Macaulay directed him to negotiate directly with the Fula king and none other, to obtain a formal invitation to place a company factory at Timbo itself, to investigate the extent of trade between the Futa Jalon and the Niger River, and to open the path between Timbo and Freetown via Port Loko and the Scarcies. It is also clear that Watt knew little about the political situation in the Fula Empire, and he was unaware of the difficulties in the dual capitals among the Fula and the precarious nature of paths along the Guinea/Scarcies corridor. He went prepared to give gifts and to pay for his provisions either with trade goods or metal or with promissory notes payable by Fortune, Walker, or Lawrence in the Rio Nunez.

The expedition misfired almost from its beginning. John Lowes who was to act as Watt's deputy on the expedition became incapacitated by boils and was unable to proceed beyond the factories in the Rio Nunez. Luckily, Matthew Winterbottom, brother of the settlement's doctor physician Thomas, volunteered to accompany Watt to Timbo and to keep a second journal in which he would describe the peoples, commerce, fauna, climate, and terrain through which they travelled. Winterbottom's journal no longer exists; his brother Thomas used his journal, however,
to produce *An Account of the Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone* in 1803. Matthew died at Dix Cove, Gold Coast, on 7 July 1794. Winterbottom's book is a collage of information gleaned from years of experience on the coast and not just information learned from Matthew's journal.58

Clearly, the expedition profoundly influenced the course of commercial development in the Northern Rivers of Sierra Leone, but perhaps in unexpected ways. The company and later the colony learned much about the interior and about events that had led to the development of the Fula state. Watt was a keen observer of the Fula and this journal is extraordinarily rich in detail about the peoples, their customs, and their history. Watt also clearly described the political and commercial potential in the upper Nunez river. On the other hand, the Fula people and elites in Labe and Timbo were fascinated with the Europeans in their towns and became aware of the Freetown settlement and its commercial objectives. Several important Fula figures travelled with the expedition as far as Freetown and reported their findings on their return to Timbo. These new contacts between the company and the Fula would be maintained and developed in the following years.

With reference to the northern most rivers of the Nunez or Pongo, the expedition did not transform commerce or direct it away from slave trading and to legitimate ventures. Indeed,
after a lull in slave trading, slaving commerce returned with new vigor to this part of the coast, reaching its greatest peak in the 1820s and 1830s. Slave traders in these rivers learned to work with the Sierra Leone settlers and did not switch to legitimate trade for nearly forty years, and then only when it became more profitable to raise groundnuts, often using slave labor, than to risk the illegal slave trade and losses which came from captured vessels and cargoes. Macaulay's proposal to establish a factory at Freeport in the Rio Pongo proceeded as planned in 1795, but not because of information learned from the Watt expedition or through political contacts made at Timbo. Large caravans of Fula frequented the Freeport factory, but with few goods to sell and because of the company's policy of not buying surplus bearers, the company's venture in the river floundered. After only seven years of struggle to maintain a commercial presence, the company withdrew from the Rio Pongo in 1802. Not only had it failed miserably in its attempt to extend into the northern rivers, but traders there improved their positions in coastal trade, and at least one from the Nunez and Pongo, David Lawrence of Kissassi, sought to purchase property in Freetown in 1799, thereby extending his influence into the company's settlement. The company responded to this unanticipated competition by ruling that only company personnel or settlers could hold property inside Freetown.

The more profound and most lasting impact of the expedition
lay further to the south, along the Guinea/Scarcies corridor.
Watt's return via this path rather than through the Rio Nunez opened the southern route and reopened the southern path to the Rio Pongo. Moria and Sumbuya now emerged as prominent players in trade between the interior and the British settlement. Moria, Sumbuya, Benna, and Port Loko would soon resolve major differences which had interfered with long-distance trade, although numerous conferences would be held in the following years to settle smaller and some large scale disputes along this corridor. Indeed, soon traders from Moria and Sumbuya would establish trading factories and outposts of their trading networks on Bullom Shore or in the suburbs of Freetown itself. Although this might not have been exactly the means Macaulay or his successors had in mind, Freetown was to develop into a major center of commerce on the Windward Coast. The transformation of trade at Freetown after 1800 came largely from African and EuroAfrican traders from the Northern Rivers, those who sought and seized commercial and political advantage from new opportunities made possible with the growth of a large settlement of liberated Africans at the mouth of the Sierra Leone River. Instead of a single frontier of trade governed by Europeans and their agents, there were numerous frontiers of trade existing by 1816: European, AfroAmerican/Nova Scotian, EuroAfrican, and African. Frequently these all existed side by side, in the same place and at the same time.
ENDNOTES


13. Peterson, 43.

15. Wilson, 89.


17. Peterson, 31; Ingham, 92-93; West 59.

18. Wilson, 128, 136-137, 142.


20. Falconbridge, 204.


22. Wilson, 89.


24. Ibid., 32.

25. Ibid., 39-40.

26. Ibid., 45-46.

27. Ibid., 48.


29. Knutsford, 49.

30. West, 56.

31. Wilson, 116, suggests that the directors charged Dawes to invigorate trade on the coast.

32. Knutsford, 49, 57. See the Watt journal, 35L, 39L, 47L, 49R, 68L, 79L.

33. Watt, 71L, 73R, 83R.


35. Wilson, 99-100.

36. Brantz Mayer, Captain Canot or Twenty Years of an African Slaver (New York, 1854), 76-77. One of the explanations for
rebellion at the death of an owner was the local requirement that the estate of Europeans or EuroAfricans be settled as quickly as possible. This meant, often, that all property belonging to the deceased would be liquidated, or in this case sold to slavers collecting cargoes on the coast.

37. Knutsford, 42; Watt, 2L; Falconbridge, 171; Wilson, 99-100.
38. Knutsford, 42-44.
39. Ibid., 46.
40. Ibid., 46-47; West, 56.
41. Knutsford, 45, 47.
42. Ibid., 51-52; Sandown, page 50.
43. Knutsford, 49.
44. For a detailed description of the Rio Pongo during this period, see Bruce L. Mouser, "Trade, Coasters, and Conflict in the Rio Pongo from 1790 to 1808," Journal of African History, XIV, 1(1973), 45-64.
45. Watt, 54L, 57R, and index. See also 47R, 47L, 69R, and 77R for Johnstone.
46. Watt, 4L-13R.
47. See Sandown, passim.
48. Ibid., page 56; Watt, 9R, 12R.
49. Sandown, page 62.
51. Sandown, 64-74.
52. Watt, passim., for Ventura, Mamadu Samba, and Charles Jellorum.
53. Wilson, 111; Ingham, 99, 142-146.
54. Wilson, 85-88; West, 57-58; Knutsford, 23.
55. See Watt, passim., 55R.
56. Watt, 10L.
57. See Watt, index entries for Winterbottom and journal.


60. Council, 22 July 1799, C.O. 270/4, P.R.O.