Bruce L. Mouser. — The Nunez Affair *

(Note présentée par M. Albert Duchesne)

Résumé
Cette étude apparaît comme un complément de l'article de R. Massinon, L'entreprise du Rio Nunez (Bull. Séances ARSOM, 1965) qui étudiait l'affaire du Rio Nunez dans une perspective principalement belge. B.L. Mouser met l'accent sur les conflits qui opposèrent les tribus peuplant le Rio Nunez et sur les interventions étrangères auprès des roitelets indigènes afin d'obtenir des concessions, etc. Il retrace l'histoire du fleuve dans une perspective largement internationale.

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Samenvatting
Deze studie kan gezien worden als een vervollediging van de bijdrage van R. Massinon, L'entreprise du Rio Nunez (Meded. Zittingen, KAOW, 1965) die de zaak van de Rio Nunez hoofdzakelijk in Belgisch perspectief bestudeerde. B.L. Mouser legt de klemtoon op de conflicten tussen de bevolkingen van de Rio Nunez en op de tussenkomsten van buiten bij de plaatselijke heersers, voor het verkrijgen van concessies e.d.m. Hij schetst de geschiedenis van de stroom in een ruim internationaal kader.

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Much has been written about the unsuccessful Belgian experiment with colony-making on Africa's Windward Coast during the 1840's and the 1850's (1)** R. Massinon, in his 1965

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** The numbers between ( ) refer to the notes in fine.
article *L'entreprise du Rio-Nunez*, presented the most thorough treatment to date of the *Affaire*, extensively utilizing Belgian and French archival sources and twice citing manuscript resources found in the Public Records Office, London. Most authors have sought to explain their own country's involvement during the period, and, with the possible exception of Antoine M. J. DEMOUGHOT's account of the river from earliest times to the 1930's, few have placed the «Nunez Affaire» in the larger perspective of the river's history. The purpose of this article is two-fold: to trace the roots of disagreement between French, British, and Belgian commercial interests preceding the treaty-making phase of the 1840's; and to explain the intricacies of river politics which confounded official representatives of European governments during the period.

Commerce in the Rio Nunez underwent significant changes during the quarter century preceding Belgian interest on the Windward Coast. Resident African, Eurafrican, and European traders engaged in slave trading and resisted for decades after 1808 all official attempts on the part of European governments to modify the river's trading practices. After 1830, however, commerce in legitimate products (rice, hides, ivory, wax, coffee, peanuts and gold) gradually replaced slavery as a dominant activity. The Nunez, a winding river, had only one mouth and provided no concealment for slavers seeking refuge from European men-of-war. Warships could easily blockade the estuary and seize ships trading for slaves at factories located further upstream. As a result, most slavers increasingly avoided the Nunez because of its insecurity. Caravans from the interior brought hides, ivory, wax, and gold to factories in the upper river and then sold excess porters to slavers in Portuguese entrepôts to the north or in the Rio Pongo to the south where slaving could be conducted with less risk from seizure.

The characteristics of the river's commercial communities also influenced the transition from slave to legitimate commerce. Between 1790 and 1830 only a few European slavers had established factories in the Rio Nunez and most allied themselves to Nalu commercial interests in the middle and upper river. Doctor WALKER (c. 1750-1796) operated a slaving factory at Kacundy Town where CAWNGUEU, representing the Mondialé
branch of the Landuman peoples, had his capital (2). John Pearce, a Eurafrican of mixed Nalu and American descent, inherited Walker’s commercial enterprise following his death in 1796 and with the assistance of the Nalu Towi family operated factories at Kacundy, Kissassi, and Timbi in the upper river (3). Other European traders (Fortune, Bollard, Powell, Bostock, and David Lawrence) were all of American or British origins (4).

In the 1820’s the river’s commercial community changed but only slightly. John Bateman, an English trader who operated a factory at Boké where he supported the Modiere branch of the Landuman royal family then in opposition to the lengthy rule of Calinguié at Kacundy, forced Pearce and his Nalu allies to abandon the upper river in 1821 and subsequently became the most important European trader in Landuman Country (5). The wars between Bateman and Pearce which closed paths between the Nunez, and the Futa Jallon had the additional effect of forcing the Fula, recognized as ultimate suzerains of the Nunez, to reevaluate their own role in trade and politics on the coast. When the wars ended in 1823, the Fula looked to the Nunez as the most secure of its several outlets for Futa produce on the coast. To secure continued commercial stability, the Alimamy of Timbo sent a Fula governor through the agency of the Alfa mo Labé to Kacundy to assist Calinguié, to insure against continued warfare, and to guarantee that the path remained open (6). By Fula design, the Nunez would concentrate upon legitimate rather than slave trading.

The return of stability to the river’s commerce drew several new traders to the river. Emmanuel Anthony, the son of one of Pearce’s sub-factors, returned to the river and engaged in trading in the middle river (7). Michael Proctor, a successful English trader operating a factory on Crawford’s Island in the Îles de Los, established a factory at Boké in 1826 and placed it under the supervision of a sub-factor named M. D. Tittsberry (8). Another trader was William Skelton, Jr, whose father had operated a factory in the Rio Pongo. The younger Skelton moved to the Nunez in 1826 and established his headquarters at Kanfarande and called his factory Victoria. Victoria quickly became the name by which traders referred to Kanfarande (9).
A Eurafrique who had spent more than six years in English schools, Skelton spoke French and had close commercial ties in the Rio Pongo, both important assets in the coming years (10). Another newcomer was John R. Serjeant, a Barbadian, who worked closely with Skelton and rapidly became one of the more successful slave traders in the river (11).

Following the death of Calingui in 1826 and the election of Macandé (Moidière Branch), the river’s commercial prospects improved. The Landuman capital moved from Kacundy to Boké and with it the seat of Fula authority on the coast and the center of trade in the upper river (12). Macandé, in a magnanimous gesture to lessen Nalu hostility toward his regime, permitted the Nalus under Towl to reoccupy their factories abandoned in the early 1820’s. Salifu Towel, chief of the Nalus above the Sacred Grove, subsequently operated factories at Kacundy and Kissassi in conjunction with his brothers Lamina, Yura, and Karimu. The Towel family was subservient to Chief Tokah of Caniope whose authority was recognized as extending at all Nalus in the upper river (13). The two most important Landuman traders were Macandé at Boké and Sarah (Mandiale Branch) at Kacundy, both of whom supported continued slave trading. John N. Bicaise, a Trinidadian who also spoke French, settled at Boké in 1835 and rapidly became a friend and advisor to Macandé, ruler of Landuman. Through his close association with Macandé, Bicaise acquired additional concessions at Kissassi and Rapas where he often entertained naval commanders of British and French warships (14).

While British and American traders had dominated commerce in the Nunez before 1835, the following decade saw the introduction of new competition from the North, from the energetic French trading firms based on the island of Goree and at Saint-Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River. With the return of the French comptoir (factory) of Albreda in the Gambia River to French possession in 1817, traders from Goree and Saint-Louis expanded their commerce into the Rivieres du Sud. Within five years Gorean traders were visiting the Casamance. Trade in the Casamance was disappointing, however, because competition from factories on the Cacheu and Gambia rivers was strong.
and, more importantly, sandbar at the mouth closed the river to large vessels (15).

The availability of wax and hides, the discovery in 1836 that a superior brand of coffee was available, and the absence of powerful commercial opponents drew French traders to the Nunez. Two sets of brothers, René and Durand Valentine and Antoine and Pierre d'Ernville entered the river's commerce in 1836 and established factories at Boké, the capital of Macandé (16). Within two years, three additional French traders had entered the river. Charles Boucaline opened a factory at Kissassi, and M. Laporte moved a few miles upstream from Rapas where he established a factory in a town which subsequently took his name, La Portia (17). Auguste Santon established a coffee plantation and a factory at the village of Katukuma, afterwards called Bel-Air (18). The introduction of new traders between 1832 and 1838 profoundly altered commercial patterns which had dominated trade in the Nunez since the turn of the century. Most dealt only in legitimate products and represented, or would soon represent, the interest of large trading firms along the Windward Coast.

Political and commercial stability in the Nunez, which followed Macandé's election as ruler of the Landumans in 1827, collapsed early in 1838 when Macandé died. During his period of rule, Macandé had attempted to suppress the Mondialé branch by allying himself firmly to the Fula representative at Boké and to the head of the Landuman secret Simo Society, named Boucheny (19).

Augmenting these alliances with established sources of traditional authority, Macandé sought to frustrate the commercial success of Chief Sarah of Kacundy by permitting the return of Nalus to Kacundy and Kissassi.

Following Macandé's death, the possibility of Sarah's becoming the new ruler was met with apprehension by Landuman traders based at Boké. A transfer of political power from Boké to Kacundy, as demanded by Landuman succession tradition, meant as well that the terminus of caravan trade would move to Kacundy. Perhaps of greater importance was the concern that Sarah would attempt to free the Landumans from the Fula yoke and restore the Nunez as a major source of slaves. An at-
tempt to obtain either of these objectives would curtail trade from the interior, deprive the river of its new-found markets abroad, and certainly invite a forceful intervention by the Fula.

Despite the uncertainty of his course, SARAH launched an attack and easily overran the Fula garrison at Boké even before the Simo announced his election. This action temporarily terminated Fula Suzerainty in the Nunez. Impressed by SARAH'S success, BONCHENY and the Simo Society declared in his favor and installed him as the new Landuman ruler at the beginning of the rainy season. The Fula did not respond immediately to the collapse of Fula authority on the coast because the rainy season had closed paths to the river and warfare in the Futa postponed any punitive expedition into the river (20).

Tasting success in his policy of suppressing Fula authority and in his winning of support from the Simo, SARAH sought to quickly consolidate his political position before pockets of opposition could develop. Next in line for suppression were the Nalu traders at Kacundy and Kissassi who had proved themselves worthy competitors in the upper river. SARAH'S election signalled the beginning of a purge of Nalu interests and a removal of Landumans who opposed his policies. SARAH also determined to lessen the power of European traders who had aligned themselves either to the Nalus or to legitimate commerce. Soon after his election, therefore, SARAH ordered his followers to harass legitimate trade and to burn Nalu factories located above the Sacred Grove (21).

Unprepared to resist the united Landuman force, Salifu Towl led the Nalu traders, including several Landumans opposed to SARAH'S policies, approximately fifteen miles downstream where he founded a new town, called Kassacabuli (22). Although located in Nalu territory and theoretically subject to Chief TOKAH of Caniope Towl became the de facto ruler of the Nalu people at Kassacabuli and above Caniope on the right bank of the river. All French and British traders who had concluded contracts with MACANDA now discovered the river divided into two war camps aligned along both tribal and territorial lines. Several Europeans, including BCAISE and ANTHONY, who operated factories both above and below the Sacred Grove found themselves open to pressures from both parties to the dispute.
With the Nalus forced downstream and internal opposition further diminished, SARAH turned against the legitimate traders. In June 1838 he drastically increased the custom and anchorage duties charged foreigners trading in the river by quadrupling customs from 50 to 200 dollars per year and by raising anchorage duties from 16 to 200 dollars. Captain HADFIELD of the English brig GYPSEY, had the misfortune of being anchored off Kacundy at the time and of initially refusing to pay the new duty. Furious at this affront to this new authority, SARAH ordered him beaten, and HADFIELD subsequently paid the duty (23). When René VALENTINE and Charles BOUCAULINE objected to the increased custom charges on resident traders, SARAH summarily dismissed their protests and ordered the factories of both burned (24).

SARAH’S opposition to legitimate trade not only reflected his own views about the trade but also those of his advisor, Boi MODU. Boi MODU’s reasons for opposing both the Nalus and the legitimate traders were two-fold. Claiming to be the son of the deceased W.H. LEIGH of the Iles de Los and more recently from the coast neighboring the islands, MODU had ample reason to distrust legitimate traders from Sierra Leone (25). In 1818, Governor MacCarthy of Sierra Leone seized the islands which subsequently became an entrepôt for legitimate commerce along the Windward Coast. During the following decade, the identification of «legitimate trade» as the adversary of «natives» or African control of commerce became most evident. In 1821 Governor MacCarthy in an attempt to restore legitimate commerce in the Melacoree, Foricariah, and Pereira rivers sent Lieutenant Gordan LAING to mediate the Moria war (26). Although these negotiations failed, legitimate trade, especially in lumber, spread steadily northward from Sierra Leone, and in 1826 Governor MACAULAY obtained a cession of Matacong Island and a mile-strip of Moria’s coastline. While this treaty was later disavowed, the treaty was significant since the British negotiator at the conference was none other than Michael PROCTOR who operated factories at Bolé, Kissassi and Kacundy under MACANDE’S protection from the early 1830’s (27). PROCTOR and the other legitimate traders resident in the Nunez consequently represented to Boi MODU the possibility of future Sierra Leone intervention on their behalf and a further extension of British influence north-
ward from Sierra Leone. MODU's opposition to Sulifu Towl was a matter of political expediency. MODU used Towl's presence above the Grove to rally the Landumans behind the new leader in a war of tribal pride against the Nalus.

With the Fula temporarily preoccupied by disputes in the interior, the first response to SARAH's attack against legitimate trade came from the Europeans. HADFIELD, VALENTINE, and BOURCALLE reported SARAH's actions to French and British naval authorities at Goree and Freetown but failed to obtain as rapid a response as they might have expected. With the rainy season at its peak, few captains of warships would choose to risk entering the river when mosquitoes and fevers were a certainty. Not until November 1838 did H.M.S. Carlou and the French Corvette La Fine answer their appeals for assistance. The commanders asked SARAH to call a palaver of chiefs and traders to resolve his disagreement with the traders. Confronted by superior fire power, SARAH chose expediency and complied with the request. Most of the legitimate traders attended this conference. SARAH promised to protect the property of all Europeans in the river while his dispute with Towl continued. More important, he signed the first agreement between a chief and the traders as a group. In this agreement he reinstated the anchorage duty at 16 dollars but was able to retain customs at the new level of 200 dollars per annum (28).

The November 1838 meeting established several precedents which left the chiefs and the traders with mixed and imprecise impressions. SARAH's willingness to negotiate with the traders over customs and anchorage duties had undoubtedly been influenced by the potential firepower of the Carlou and the Fine and the possibility of its use on the traders' behalf. As a result, he made an agreement which he afterwards honored only when warships were present and insofar as the agreement did not interfere with his attempt to consolidate power in the upper river. The traders, on their part, had called in warships for the first time to force SARAH to accede to their own demands. Finally, the written agreement between SARAH and the traders constituted a de facto recognition by SARAH of the existence of a community of legitimate traders, as strangers, which could collectively negotiate for commercial advantages. The landlord-
stranger relationship which formerly had been drawn on a one-to-one basis had advanced to a new level. SARAH could no longer act capriciously against a single trader without the risk of alienating the entire trading community and thereby of inviting a visit from a warship.

While the November 1838 agreement had, at least temporarily, resolved the traders' difficulties with SARAH, it did not end the dispute between SARAH and TOWL. Neither did it appear that Sarah was willing to resolve his differences with TOWL without further confrontation, for SARAH'S Mandingo advisor, Boi Moou, advised him to continue his pressure on TOWL. TOWL, in turn, blamed Boi Moou for the latest conflict and refused to consider a reconciliation with the Landumans until Boi Moou left the river (29). The first phase of the Nalu-Landuman dispute had accomplished little more than to enhance the position of the European community.

With the exit of the Curlew and the Fine from the Nunez late in November 1838 and with yet no attempt by the Fula to reimpose suzerainty after the massacre of their garrison earlier in the year, SARAH renewed his interference with legitimate commerce. Late in February 1839 SARAH obstructed the normal trade of the American vessel Transit, the English brig Jane, and the French schooner Jalouse (30). Meanwhile TOWL escalated his own dispute with SARAH by placing a blockade on the river at Kassacabuli and by charging Europeans an additional custom of 20 dollars for the privilege of trading upstream. The captain of the British schooner Isabella Ann was the first to fall victim to the double anchorage duties. Having paid TOWL'S charges at Kassacabuli, the schooner proceeded to Kacundy early in March 1839 where SARAH also demanded a duty which he raised from 16 to 80 dollars. A few days later, the Sierra Leone cutter George Rendall attempted to run the blockade at Kassacabuli. TOWL ordered his warriors to open fire, and the cutter also paid the additional fee (31).

By the time Lieutenant HILL of H.M.S. Saracen arrived on March 23, 1839, in answer to new appeals for protection and for a return to uninterrupted commerce, a large army of Fula warriors and a new governor, Mamadu BOYE, had arrived at Kacundy, had reestablished Fula authority in the upper river,
and had ended Sarah's interference with trade (32). Nonetheless, Hill blockaded the river's mouth on March 23, 1839, and proceeded by longboat to Kassacabuli to hold discussion with Towl. Towl agreed to end his war against Sarah and to cease his harassment of legitimate commerce but demanded that Boi Modu, Sarah's advisor, be forced to leave the Rio Nunez. In Hill's presence Towl signed an agreement with Benjamin Campbell (a newly arrived trader from Sierra Leone), John Bicaire, Emmanuel Anthony, and Mr. Laporte. Towl promised to protect the property of all French and British traders in any renewal of hostilities between himself and Sarah (33).

Campbell and Anthony then accompanied Hill to Kacundy town where a conference called by Mamadu Boye was already in progress. The Fula governor had summoned the conference of Landuman chiefs to determine whether Sarah should remain as ruler and to remove all obstacles to trade with the interior. By 1839 Fula policy toward Nunez trade demanded that the Nunez path remain open to legitimate commerce and that Sarah cease all harassment of European traders. Whereas the Nunez would provide a secure outlet for Fula produce, factories in the Pongo area would serve as the Futa's principal entrepôt for slaves. Two French traders, A.E. Carvallis and one of the d'Erneville brothers who represented French interests in the river, joined Campbell, Anthony, and Hill at Kacundy.

At Mamadu Boye's insistence, Sarah acknowledged his June 1838 attack upon Captain Hadfield of the Gypsy and return to Hill the overcharge of 184 dollars. Sarah also agreed to guarantee the previously established 16 dollars anchorage duty, but he signed an agreement with Carvallis, d'Erneville, Campbell, and Anthony which granted him the right to charge all traders, whether residents or ship captains, a trading license of 300 dollars per annum or 25 dollars per month or portion thereof. This latter provision represented a significant increase in annual customs in the upper river; it also instituted a new tax upon ship captains who hereafter were required to pay a trading fee in addition to the 16 dollar anchorage duty (34). The French traders profited by this new agreement for most resided in the river only during the trading season (about five months of the year) and returned during the summer months to Goree or
Saint-Louis when trade was minimal and when fevers were most prevalent (35).

Having dispensed with the immediate difficulties between SARAH and the traders, Mamadu BOYE turned to the dispute between SARAH and Salifu TOWL. Hill presented TOWL's demands that SARAH's advisor, Boi MODU, be exiled from the river, and to everyone's surprise, Mamadu BOYE offered then and there to decapitate Boi Modao (sic), and thus at once restore trade to its usual channels (36). Aghast at Mamadu BOYE's solution, Hill declined the proposal and Boi MODU fled the country in haste. Hill left the river on March 25, 1839 (37).

The arrival a few days later of the French corvette Fine, under the command of Lieutenant QUERRET, gave the resident traders a second opportunity to extract new agreements with SARAH and Salifu TOWL. Mamadu BOYE agreed to call a new conference at Kacundy for April 1, 1839, less than a week after the traders had signed an agreement under Hill's auspices and protection. At this conference, SARAH signed a new commercial agreement with Antoine and Pierre d'ERNEVILLE, John BICAISE, LAPORTE, and Benjamin CAMPBELL. The resident traders recognized SARAH as the legitimate ruler of the Landumans and promised to join him in warfare, if necessary, to maintain his authority. In return SARAH promised not to reappoint Boi MODU to his staff, to respect the property of TOWL and all the Nalus who had left Kacundy in mid-1838, to permit them to return to Kacundy, and, finally, to retain the 16 dollar anchorage duty. SARAH further agreed to contact the Commandant of Goree or an officer charged to act in his behalf should he in the future plan to raise anchorage duties. Two days later, QUERRET, the d'ERNEVILLES, LAPORTE, CAMPBELL, and BICAISE proceeded to Kassacabuli where, joined by Emmanuel ANTHONY, they signed a new agreement with Salifu TOWL and his brother Rachia. TOWL accepted the conditions of the agreement signed by SARAH and promised to protect legitimate commerce in the middle river (38).

The agreements of March and April failed to resolve completely the problem of political control in the river area for neither TOWL nor SARAH had vanquished the other. The intervention of the Pula, who wanted the river open to trade and who
had the military power to force the compliance of both SARAH and TOWL, had ended the first phase of the war. In return for his recognition of SARAH as the legitimate ruler of the Landumans, the Fula recognized TOWL as a major chief in the middle river and promised to protect Nalu property in Landuman Country. SARAH for his part retained his right to collect customs and anchorage duties, but he also acquired the dubious advantages of Fula protection and those restrictions which a Fula governor in his capital might impose. As long as the Fula remained encamped at Kacundy, SARAH could be expected to honor his ceasefire with TOWL and his agreements with European traders.

The 1838-39 war brought several important changes. While both TOWL and SARAH obtained new stature vis-à-vis the trading community and consolidated their control of various sections of the river, the Fula also reestablished suzerainty over the Landumans and Nalus and provided the principal source of stability to the river’s commerce. Moreover, as a group, the resident traders and forestalled increases in anchorage duties but had lost ground in customs. The resolution of the first phase of the Nalu-Landuman dispute and Sarah’s harassment of legitimate commerce involved more parties than had the war itself.

The arrival of French traders in the Nunez and their success during the war in obtaining advantageous trading rights was a source of concern, however, to the resident British traders, especially to Michael PROCTOR who operated factories at Boké, Kissassi, and Kacundy. PROCTOR was convinced that the British tariff of 1s. 6d. per hundredweight on Nunez coffee, in contrast to the preferred rate of 6d. on coffee exported from British colonies, would drive the river into French hands. PROCTOR had invested heavily in coffee plantations near Boké and Kissassi and in January and June 1839 he petitioned to Lord GLENELG, colonial secretary, for a reduction of the British import tax on Nunez grown coffee. While he acknowledged that the Nunez was not part of the colony at Sierra Leone, he nonetheless described it as a «colonial dependency» (39). London, however, refused even to reply.

A year later and after it became known that more than 400 tons of coffee were exported from the Nunez area during the 1840-41 trading season alone, officials at Sierra Leone also
grew convinced that the Nunez might fall into French hands. Governor John Carr became the champion of tariff reform and in August 1841 proposed a unique method of obtaining the special tariff on Nunez coffee. Carr recommended that Britain obtain a cession of the Rio Nunez from the Alimamy at Timbo. The Colonial Office interpreted the scheme as just another attempt by Sierra Leone governors to extend the colony’s boundaries and refused emphatically to consider Carr’s proposal (40).

The French traders, also concerned by high tariffs, were more successful in obtaining relief than were their British counterparts. Perhaps in response to Proctor’s petition in 1839 and concerned that Britain would revise its own tariff policy, several French traders applied in 1839 for a reduction of the French duty on foreign grown coffee. Officials at Goree acted on their behalf, wrote the French Ministry of Colonies reporting the great commercial potential of the Rio Nunez, and suggested establishing a garrison in the river to protect French commerce. No immediate action was taken on the latter proposal. Although the French reduced import duties on peanuts and several other West African products in July 1840 on the condition that they must be carried in French vessels, the tax on Nunez coffee remained at the former and unfavorable rate of 98 francs per hundred kilos (41).

Between March 1839 and late 1840, trade continued uninterrupted in the Rio Nunez and the presence of a Fula garrison and a Fula governor at Boké restrained Sarah from engaging in any further harassment of commerce. During this period hides, wax, ivory, gold, and coffee continued to dominate legitimate trade. American traders were particularly in evidence along the coast in search of trimmed hides which were important to New England leather industries (42).

The 1840-41 trading season was a particularly unprofitable one for traders in the Nunez. Renewed warfare in the Futa between Alimamy Yaya (Soriya) and the contender, Bbakar (Alfaya), closed the Nunez path early in the season and kept it closed. Early in January 1841 the Fula dispatched a new governor to the river in the company of the first large Fula caravan. Sarah saw advantage from continued conflict in the interior and ordered an ambush of the caravan. The Fula governor was
Idled, and the Fula failed to send another for more than a year (43). With no Fula garrison at Boké to stay SARAH’s hand, SARAH once again placed obstacles before the French traders who reentered the river’s commerce once the 1841 rains ended. Late in the year René VALENTINE of Boké applied to C. A. DAGORNE, commandant of Gorée, for assistance to force SARAH to negotiate new terms, and DAGORNE, ever a champion of French traders, dispatched two men-of-war, the Fine and the A louette, which arrived in the river early in January 1842 (44). Commander Philippe DE KERHALLET of the A louette heard the complaints of Charles BOUCALINE, LAPORTE, and Emmanuel ANTHONY at Rapas and then proceeded to Kacundy on January 10, 1842, where he signed an important new agreement with SARAH.

SARAH again promised to protect French property and lowered the monthly customs for French traders from 20 to 10 dollars. Customs for British traders remained at the previous rate of 20 dollars per month. The January 1842 negotiations differed significantly from those which preceded it. In addition to the traders’ agreement regulating customs to French traders, DE KERHALLET, in the name of France, signed a treaty with SARAH recognizing him as the legitimate ruler of the Landumans and promising to uphold his authority with French protection. The language of the treaty recognized the Landumans as tributary to the Fula and stipulated that should hostilities commence between the Landumans and Fula, France would not honor its agreement with SARAH (45). This was not only the first treaty between any of the river’s chiefs and a European power but also the first agreement which recognized Fula suzerainty in the upper river.

Soon after the A louette left the river in 1842, Salifu TOWL died, and Lamina TOWL assumed his brother’s position as leader of the Nalus at Kassacabuli. An important trader in his own right, Lamina TOWL over the years had associated closely with British traders in the river as well as with American traders who frequented this section of the Windward Coast (46). His brother’s death enabled Lamina TOWL to enhance his own position in the river’s trade and revived the dream of an expanding Nalu influence in the upper river. With his ties with British traders firmly established, Lamina immediately commenced nego-
tations with the resident French traders as the new Nalu chief and declared his protection of French property in the middle river (47). In this manner Towt sought to depict himself as a defender of legitimate commerce and a logical recipient of French support should Sarah endanger French property above the Sacred Grove.

Sarah chose to interpret Salifu's death and Lamin's flirtation with the French traders as an excuse to refute all previous agreements respecting the protection of Nalu property above the Sacred Grove and to launch a renewed strike against legitimate commerce. Sarah subsequently sent warriors to the French factories at Boké and Kacundy late in the 1841-42 trading season and seized a large quantity of gunpowder and other merchandise. Sarah claimed that Lamina Towt was planning an invasion of Landuman Country and that his expropriation of French property was provided for in the January 1842 treaty (48). The traditional landlord-stranger relationship also demanded that strangers support their landlords in time of war. Without a Fula governor resident at Kacundy, Sarah was free to implement whatever policy he chose.

Both French and British traders objected to Sarah's action and again called for the assistance of warships. Before the British Steam Vessel Albert, under Acting-Lieutenant Macleod B. Cockcroft, and the French brig Malouine, commanded by Lieutenant Alphonse De Langle, entered the river more than six months later in response to their appeals, however, a new Fula army had arrived at Kacundy and restored stability to the upper river. Cockcroft and De Langle met at Rapas in late November 1842 to discuss the plight of the French traders, Lieutenant De Langle agreed to remain in the river until the river's commerce returned to normal; Cockcroft left the river on November 27 (49).

A few days after the Albert's departure, Lieutenant De Langle and the Fula governor called a new conference which would meet at Kacundy in early December 1842 and would include all parties involved in the most recent disruption of trade. Many of the British and French traders, Lamina Towt and his brothers, and Sarah, his sons, and subchiefs met on December 6, 1842, and signed a treaty which radically revised the provisions of
the January 1842 agreement. Convinced that SARAH had willingly violated his agreement with the traders, Lieutenant DE LANGLE withdrew French protection. Neither the French nor the Fula believed that SARAH could be trusted to refrain from molesting legitimate traders. To diminish SARAH's role in French commerce, Lamina TOWL was designated as collector of monthly customs and anchorage duties from French vessels and traders on the condition that he deposit all duties with the Landuman ruler. As a sign of good faith, TOWL was required to leave his son at Kacundy in SARAH'S care. The treaty also stipulated that all French traders were to channel their complaints through Lamina TOWL who would forward all communications to Commandant DAGORNE in Goree. LAMINA and SARAH further agreed to a 10 dollar per month custom for French traders and a 16 dollar anchorage duty. The latter duty could not be collected until a vessel had begun to trade (50).

While the French treaty defined the relationship and customs of French traders to the chiefs, British traders with factories above the Sacred Grove continued to pay the former custom charge of 25 dollars per month to SARAH. In an attempt to standardize duties and the manner of payment, BICAISE, PROCTOR, and CAMPBELL immediately sought assistance at Freetown in obtaining a similar downward revision of rates for British traders in the river (51).

Three months lapsed before a British warship answered these appeals for assistance. Lieutenant COCKCRAFT of the ALBERT entered the river in April 1843 and proceeded to Kacundy where he signed, in the presence of the Fula governor, the first British treaty with a chief in the river. The treaty recognized SARAH as the ruler of the Landumans and granted him British protection. In return SARAH promised to protect British traders and their property, to keep the river open to vessels of all nations, and to maintain open communications with the interior. COCKCRAFT also acquired the sought downward revision of customs for British resident traders equal to the rate which the French traders had obtained a few months earlier but agreed to a continuation of the established custom of 25 dollars per month upon non-resident traders frequenting the river (52). In contrast to the French
treaty, British traders were to pay all duties and customs directly to SARAH.

The French and British treaties of 1842 and 1843, while recognizing the existence of separate British and French trading communities, also granted de facto recognition to Lamina TOWL and SARAH as legitimate rulers in those sections of the river which they then occupied. During the treaty negotiations TOWL had successfully used the presence of the naval warships and Fula dissatisfaction with SARAH to gain temporary advantage over his opponent. Of the two leaders, SARAH fared far worse as a result of his activities against legitimate commerce for he lost the right to collect duties from French traders in Landuman Country. Soon thereafter and probably at Fula insistence, SARAH moved his capital and himself from Kacundy to Boké where the Fula governor could control him more easily. SARAH appointed his son TONGa as the chief of Kacundy in his absence.

TONGa soon proved as vexatious to legitimate trade as had his father. Before a new Fula governor could be sent from Timbo at the end of the 1843 rainy season, TONGa ordered a number of attacks on British and French trading vessels in the upper river. Moreover, LAMINA refused to forward to TONGa those customs and duties paid by French traders, and TONGa retaliated by collecting what amounted to double duties on French vessels proceeding above the Sacred Grove. With commerce in the river once more brought to a halt, several of the traders sought the intercession of SARAH in the developing contest between TONGa and LAMINA. Perhaps in response to a brief visit by Lieutenant Cockcroft early in January 1844 and certainly at the urging of the Fula governor who had recently arrived at Boké, SARAH agreed to attend a conference at Rapas and to bring an end to the constant interruption of trade. LAMINA also agreed to attend the conference, but in secret he organized an attack force under the direction of his brother YURA who was directed to kidnap SARAH upon his arrival at Rapas and hold him hostage to force TONGa to accept a new political settlement (53).

Before LAMINA could implement his plan the Albert reappeared at the river's mouth, proceeded upstream, and on January 27, 1844, halted all trade on the river above Rapas. LAMINA was infuriated by this British interference and ordered YURA to
proceed by canoe to Rapas where he would seize SARAH as planned (54). Lieutenant COCKCRAFT surprised YURA in transit, and when YURA refused to halt, COCKCRAFT boarded the canoe and took YURA prisoner. In the meantime SARAH arrived at Rapas in the company of the Fula governor. SARAH agreed to order TONGO to reduce anchorage duties to the established amount of 16 dollars (55).

A few days later and with SARAH’s agreement in hand, COCKCRAFT proceeded to Kassacabuli to obtain TOWL’s acceptance as well as an explanation of YURA’s attempt to run the blockade. Instead LAMINA presented his own demands. Since the attack on his war canoe, he had seized a canoe and boat belonging to an unidentified British trader and was prepared to hold both as hostage in exchange for his brother. COCKCRAFT refused to negotiate and, enraged by TOWL’s impudence, began a bombardment of Kassacabuli on February 1, 1844. On the next day, COCKCRAFT learned of another armed force loyal to LAMINA at Bel-Air, moved the *Albert* within range, and shelled this town as well. On the third day COCKCRAFT landed marines at Kassacabuli but failed to take the stockade (56).

SARAH and TONGO, meanwhile, interpreted COCKCRAFT’S attack on TOWL’s stronghold at Kassacabuli and his pursuit of the Nalu forces on the right bank as a significant shift of British support in their favor. Within a few days the Landumans launched an offensive. Advancing downstream along both banks of the river, they attacked Kassacabuli by land and occupied TOWL’s capital TOWL and his followers fled to the right bank where they collected a large force of Nalu warriors and began to advance upstream to meet the Landuman army at Rapas. News of the impending Nalu attack upon Rapas swiftly reached traders resident there, and COCKCRAFT landed marines to defend British and French property located in the town. In the meantime Chief TOKAR of Caniope, who governed the Nalu between Victoria and Caniope, requested COCKCRAFT to come to Caniope where, on February 21, he sued for peace on behalf of Nalu people living in his domain (57). Two days later the French traders received word that the French warships *Zebra*, under Lieutenant DE MONLEON, and *Alert*, under Commander Bosangner, would soon arrive to protect French property. Within a few days both the
Nalus and the Landumans ceased fighting, at least until the intentions of the warships could be determined (58).

On March 7, 1844, Commander Bosangner of the Albert, Lieutenant de Monleon of the Zebra, and Lieutenant Cockcraft of the Albert met with twelve Nalu chiefs at Rapas and signed a truce which ended the latest period of hostilities. They signed a similar agreement eleven days later at Kacundy under the supervision of the Fula governor with Sarah and Tonga. Both the French and British continued to recognize Sarah as ruler of the Landumans, but the French agreement maintained a separation between political and commercial roles of chiefs in the river; French traders would continue to pay customs and duties to Lamina Towl (59).

The second phase of the Nalu-Landuman war had for the first time involved a European warship as a combatant in the dispute. By testing the patience of Lieutenant Cockcraft, Lamina Towl created an incident which was interpreted by Sarah and Tonga as an opportunity to strike against the Nalus in the middle river. The war lasted only a few weeks and ended when French Warships were reported to be approaching the river. The agreements subsequently signed settled nothing for no changes were made from previous agreements. Instead, the most evident change in 1843 and 1844 was the increasing appearance and role of the Fula in Landuman politics. The governor, arriving generally at the beginning of the year, forced Sarah to attend the conference at Rapas, in Nalu Country. Sarah's subsequent promise to restrain Tonga reflected not a change in Landuman policy but rather the power which a Fula governor could exert in the politics of a tributary people.

The beginning of the 1844-45 trading season failed to produce the normalization commerce, however, which the British and French interventions in March 1844 had supposedly guaranteed. Sarah, ruler of the Landumans since 1838, died late in 1844, and his death initiated a period in intrigue and political confusion which restricted commerce in the upper river area. Since no Fula governor had yet arrived at Boké and since tradition dictated that no new ruler could be elected until the rainy season, campaigning by contenders for the chieftaincy occupied much of the trading season. Landuman tradition also demanded that
the next ruler be selected from the Modiere branch of the Landuman royal family and the capital be moved from Kacundy to Boké.

The possibility of a transfer of the capital to Boké and to the center of French interests in the upper river was remote at best in 1844, however, for SARAH had two determined sons, Tongo and MAYORE, and neither would willingly relinquish the chieftaincy to a contender from the modiere branch. Instead, Tongo, the more powerful and experienced and the chief of Kacundy town, gained the support of the elders, of BONCHENY who was the head of the Simo Society, and of a majority of the British traders who did not want the commercial capital moved to Boké and into French hands. Moreover, BONCHENY announced that since MAYORE was the younger brother and was the son of a slave woman his election would violate Landuman succession practice (61).

The question of moving the political capital to Boké where the Fula governor would inevitably exert paramount influence was perhaps the most important factor influencing the decision of the Simo. When the Fula forced SARAH to move his capital to Boké in 1843, the Fula governor had established a garrison at Boké. BONCHENY and the elders saw in Tongo as in SARAH before him, a leader who might throw off the Fula yoke and one who might force a military solution of the continuing Nalu-Landuman dispute (62).

MAYORE, despite the improbability of his election, moved to Boké where he claimed the allegiance of the Modiere branch by residence if not by birth. He was supported by young Landuman chiefs who sought conciliation with the Fula and by the newly-arrived Fula governor, MADRI, who wanted uninterrupted trade in the river and was afraid that TONGO'S election would rekindle the now dormant Landuman-Nalu war and endanger trade. The French traders of Boké also favored MAYORE for they saw only continued commercial disadvantage should the capital remain at Kacundy. Lastly, Lamina TOWL also preferred MAYORE'S election for he considered MAYORE the more conciliatory toward Nalu interests in the upper river (63).

Between late 1844 when SARAH died and the beginning of the 1846 rainy season, trade with the interior resumed but
the upper river had divided into two camps of nearly equal strength. Tongo held Kacundy and the towns of Kissassi and Kanduma. Mayoré occupied the strategic commercial center at Boké and was in a position to influence trade along the Nunez path. The support of Fula Governor Madhi was equally important to Mayoré's candidacy, and for more than a year Madhi's alignment with Mayoré succeeded in forcing the Simo Society to postpone an announcement of Tongo's election. When Madhi left the river area at the beginning of the 1846 rainy season, however, Boncheny declared Tongo the legitimate successor to Sarah (64). Boncheny's proclamation ended the period of campaigning and opened a period of political and military confrontation in Landuman Country, for Mayoré refused to accept Boncheny's decision as settling his dispute with Tongo. With the Nalus continuing to support Mayoré, moreover, Tongo could not risk a direct attack to dislodge Mayoré from his well-fortified position at Boké without risking a Nalu offensive against Kacundy. Mayoré soon demonstrated the importance of Boké to the river's commerce when Governor Madhi returned to Boké at the beginning of the 1846-47 trading season. Madhi did not have a Fula army at his disposal and with the Pongo, Moria, and Port-Loko paths open to Fula trade, the decision was made to close the Nunez path for the 1846-47 trading season in an attempt to force the Simo to reverse its decision. Tongo retaliated by closing the river to commerce between Kissassi and the Sacred Grove (65). For nearly a year trade languished in the upper Nunez although some Fula goods reached factories in the lower river.

The French traders located above Kacundy were most disadvantaged by the closing of the river. At their urging Mayoré met late in 1847 with Lamina Towl and with Antoine and Pierre d'Erneville and Charles Boucaline to discuss the possibility of common action against Tongo (66). Mayoré asked Lamina to join him in a combined expedition against Tongo, but Lamina hesitated because of the cost involved. When the French traders assured Lamina that the French government would reimburse any costs in the expedition, Lamina agreed and a few weeks later, a large force of Nalu mercenaries, under the direction of
Lamina’s brother Yura, chief of Kassacabuli, joined Mayore’s warriors at Boké (67).

The military alliance between the Nalus and Mayore radically altered the balance of power in the river. With Yura in command, the combined force launched its attack upon Kacundy town. Realizing the odds against mounting a defense against the superior force, Tongo set fire to his capital and sought sanctuary below Kacundy in the Sacred Grove, an area into which Mayore could not legally pursue him according to the regulations of the Simo Society. With Tongo defeated and Kacundy occupied, Madhi ordered the elders of the Simo Society to call a grand palaver which would meet at Boké early in February 1848 for the purpose of electing a new ruler (68).

Before this meeting commenced, H.M. Steam Vessel Grappler arrived at Rapas on February 7, 1848, in response to appeals for assistance by British traders who feared that any change in Landuman kingship would endanger British property. John Bicaise and Benjamin Campbell informed Lieutenant Thomas Lysaght of the recent warfare in the upper river, expressing their concern that Mayore would take reprisals upon their factories at Boké, Kissassi, and Kacundy because of their former support for the now vanquished Tongo. Two French warships, the Fine and Amaranthe under the command of Commander Decust de Villeneuve also arrived in the river after the attack upon Kacundy. Lysaght and de Villeneuve met at Rapas and, with all resident traders present, discussed the possible consequences of Mayore’s forthcoming election upon the future of legitimate commerce in the upper river (69).

At the suggestion of the British traders, the naval officers reached a compromise which satisfied both the French and British trading communities. The commanders agreed to recognize Tongo as ruler as long as he moved his capital to Boké; this solution promised to protect British property in the upper river and satisfied the desire of the French traders that the capital be transferred to Boké. Lysaght carried the joint proposal to the palaver at Boké. Madhi, however, refused to abandon his support for Mayore and instead gave his assurance that the Fula would guarantee the protection of British property above the Sacred Grove. With this promise, Lysaght agreed to Ton-
GO's deposition and journeyed to Rapas where he received a similar guarantee from Lamina Towl a few days later. On February 14, 1848, Bonchény declared Mayoré the legitimate ruler and transferred the political capital to Boké. Lysaght left the river three days later, leaving behind the French warships and a Belgian man-of-war, the Louise Marie, which had docked at Rapas the preceding night (70).

Once Lysaght had sailed from the river, de Villeneuve proceeded to Boké where on February 21 he signed a treaty with the new ruler of the Landumans. This treaty recognized Mayoré as the legitimate ruler in return for a guarantee of free trade, a cession of territory at Boké to France, protection of French property, a Most-favored nation treatment, and the right of French traders to fortify their factories. Instead of the former monthly custom of 10 dollars, the treaty stipulated that a total payment of 1,000 dollars—to be collected among all French traders having property in Landuman Country—would be paid annually to the Fula governor as the representative of the Alimamy of Timbo who would act as the collecting agent for the Landuman ruler. Anchorage duties, now detailed according to type of vessel, were to be paid to Mayoré and divided equally with Lamina Towl (71). This was the first treaty which recognized the Fula's role in the maintenance of amicable relations between chiefs and traders. It also officially recognized the Fula as suzerains of both the Landumans and the Nalus.

The person, other than Tongo, most disturbed by the resolution of the dispute for the Landuman chieftaincy was Lamina Towl. While Tongo had been defeated and the threat of Landuman invasion of the middle river had been diminished by Mayoré's election, Mayoré refused to reward Lamina's earlier support in the chieftaincy dispute by permitting a return of Nalu traders into Landuman Country. Madhi, rather than Lamina, had gained influence at Boké. Lamina retained his control of the middle river and received an equal share of anchorage duties collected from French traders, but he fared badly in the latest treaty. He lost control of the collection of customs from French traders and saw the imposition of an active role for the Fula governor in French commerce. He also failed to receive the reimbursement for his expedition against Tongo which the French traders had
promised, an action which events later proved would cost French interests dearly.

Dissatisfied with the tide of events in the river, LAMINA was more than willing to consider a proposal made by Lieutenant VAN HAVERBEKE of the Louise Marie. Belgian interest West African Trade had developed slowly after independence from Holland and not until 1845 did the first Belgian merchantman visit the Windward Coast. This voyage was sponsored by a former oil speculator from Marseilles, Abraham COHEN, who left France in 1842 after financial failure and emigrated to Brussels. From 1845 to 1848 COHEN's interest and investment in West African trade increased steadily and in 1847 his and another firm formally requested to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the government protect Belgian commercial interests on the coast. COHEN suggested that two factories be established, one in the Bissagos Islands and one in the Rio Nunez. VAN HAVERBEKE of the Louise Marie subsequently was directed to survey the Windward Coast but was not authorized to acquire concessions (72).

Of the two sites for a Belgian factory, the Nunez was more alluring to trade than was the Bissagos for, despite the frequent interruptions caused by chieftaincy disputes and tribal warfare, trade in the lower river continued; local coffee and peanut cultivation no longer made the river's commerce dependent upon the Nunez path into the Futa Jalon. Lieutenant LYSAGHT, who visited the river during the peak of the Landuman civil war, estimated that between fifteen and twenty vessels of 200 to 300 tons capacity visited the river yearly. Most of these were French. LYSAGHT, nonetheless, claimed that British traders continued to dominate the river's commerce which amounted to approximately £40,000 annually. Because of growing demands for peanuts which went disproportionately to French markets, however, most British traders dealt directly with the merchants of Goree. Moreover, the slave trade had ceased for good reason; peanut cultivation produced a good income, was safer than slaving, and demanded large numbers of laborers (75).

Anchoring off Rapas on February 17, 1848, VAN HAVERBEKE carefully evaluated the situation in the middle and upper river and decided that Belgium could profit best by capitalizing on
Lamina's evident dissatisfaction with the French treaty and with Mayoré's refusal to reward Nalu assistance in his victory at Kacundy. On March 4, 1848, Van Haverbeke secretly negotiated an accord provisoire with Lamina, who ceded to Belgium a one mile strip on both sides of the river reaching from Victoria to Rapas in exchange for an annual sum of 1,000 dollars—500 dollars to be paid immediately before the accord was ratified by the Belgian government—and an annual custom of 10 dollars per 100 yards of territory used by any Belgian trader within the concession (74).

Van Haverbeke, in his report of May 21, 1848, to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claimed that the initial proposal for a cession of the middle river came from Lamina rather than from the Belgian commander. Van Haverbeke described Lamina as under British influence and John Bicaise as Lamina's principal advisor and trading partner. After Mayoré ceded to France territory in the vicinity of Bolé, Bicaise was adamant that no further French territorial gains be obtained and consequently, according to Van Haverbeke, suggested that Lamina offer the cession to Belgium. This act would remove that section of the river from any future French designs (75).

Van Haverbeke's interpretation of events leading to the cession indeed may be correct. Between 1844 and 1848 the British trading community had grown and had established ties with several large trading firms. The firm of Pingree and Kimball of Bathurst sold manufactured goods to English traders, and by 1845 Charles Heddle, Eurafrican partner to Jean F. Pelligrin of Senegal and a pioneer in the peanut trade in Moria Country, had established commercial ties in the Nunez (76). Another English trader visiting the Nunez was Nathaniel Isaacs who in 1844 purchased Mataong Island in Moria Country and invested heavily in the peanut trade (77). Isaacs took Mary Ann Skelton, daughter of Elizabeth and William Skelton of Victoria, as a mistress and had a son Alfred and a daughter Emma (78).

The development of a British-oriented trading community was further amplified by marital ties among the resident English traders. John Bicaise married Elizabeth Proctor, the widow of Michael Proctor, and Benjamin Campbell formed an alliance with Elizabeth Skelton in 1845. A year later Mary Ann Skelton,
former mistress of Nathaniel Isaacs, married Joseph Richmond Lightburn, son of Bailey and Styles Lightburn of Faringua in the Rio Pongo (79). Marriage alliances among principal families in the Pongo and Nunez rivers demonstrated that an English-speaking trading community was strong and was consolidating its commercial power.

Against the evidence supporting Van Haverbeke's account, Belgian intrigue cannot be discounted. Most British traders operated factories in both the upper and middle river as did the French. After Tongo's defeat in 1848, Mayore had not permitted those British traders who supported Tongo to reoccupy their concessions above the Sacred Grove. Nothing could be gained by dividing the river into two spheres of influence. Indeed, the establishment of Fula and French garrisons at Boké would bring stability to commerce which had been lacking in the past and perhaps permit the British to return to Landuman Country. Bicaise and Towl, moreover, were not on the best of terms in 1848. Lieutenant Lysaght had cautioned Towl only a few days before the accord was signed to stop his harassment of Bicaise who had supported Tongo in the Landuman chieftancy dispute (80). It would seem probable, therefore, that Van Haverbeke and Lamina sought common advantage through the accord, at the expense of the resident trading community.

The successive withdrawal of the British, French, and Belgian warships early in 1848 left the traders without protection. French traders were now collectively bound to pay customs directly to the Fula and anchorage duties to Mayore. Lamina, left out of this arrangement, meanwhile erroneously began to demand the new custom charge outlined in the Belgian treaty of all French traders between Victoria and Rapas. The French traders in turn raised their prices on trade goods. The raising of prices, while perhaps justifiable to compensate for their increased operation costs, infuriated both Mayore and the Fula governor. Madhi summarily closed the Nunez path, threatening to keep it closed until prices were lowered. These changes on the river disturbed the British traders for neither they nor the British government had signed treaties with either Mayore or Lamina, and Mayore refused them permission to reoccupy their factories at Boké without such a treaty (81).
At the beginning of the 1848-49 trading season, in the absence of agreement with either Lamina or Mayore, the British traders joined with the French in opposition to Mayore's continued harassment of commerce and formed an association of traders to more effectively oppose the Landuman ruler. John Bicaise, having risen to prominence following the death of William Skelton in 1843, became the spokesman of the association because he spoke French, was located at the important port of Nana, and had so often served as host to the commanders of the men-of-war when they visited the river (82).

With the path closed between the Nunez and the interior, the French traders withdrew from Boké and Kissassi by late December 1848, leaving Ishmail Tal at Bake as caretaker of European properties. Tal, a Wolof from Senegal and agent for Pierre d'Erneville since 1844, had married a daughter of Sarah, the former Landuman ruler, and had one son. In January 1849 Tal began negotiations with Mayore to determine those conditions which would be necessary for a resumption of trade with the interior, Tal and Mayore exchanged harsh words during these negotiations and finally Mayore ordered Tal to leave Landuman Country and informed him that should the French traders refuse to lower prices he would withdraw his protection of their factories. Tal left soon thereafter with his wife and son, but Mayore sent several men downstream to seize the woman and boy and return them to Boké. Mayore claimed that since she was of royal descent, she legally could not leave Landuman Country (83).

The breakdown of negotiations at Boké and the kidnapping from Nalu Country coincided with the reappearance, after almost a year's absence, of the Belgian warship Louise Marie at Caniope on February 13, 1849. While Van Haverbeke had returned principally to ratify the accord signed the previous year, he offered his assistance to the traders. Since no French or British men-of-war were then in the river, John Bicaise and Pierre d'Erneville suggested that Van Haverbeke take them to Boké where they, as spokesmen for the Association of Traders, would negotiate the return of Tal's wife and son and reopen trade in the river. On February 26, the Louise Marie left Caniope for Boké, having on board Bicaise, D'Erneville, Lamina, and his
brother KARIMU who joined the party to mediate between MAYORE and the traders and perhaps more importantly to keep abreast of developments in the upper river (84).

Upon reaching Kissassi, BICAISE learned that MAYORE was ashore directing construction of a factory for Mr. BRAITHWAITE and Mr. MARTIN, factors of the Forster and Smith firm of London whose principal entrepôt on the Windward coast was at Bathurst in the Gambia, on property which BICAISE had leased from TONGO. A few months earlier BRAITHWAITE and MARTIN had established a factory at Boké and, not hindered by any former associations with TONGO, sought advantage from the other traders' plight by supporting MAYORE and the Fula. As a reward for their refusal to join the Association of Traders, MAYORE rewarded them with BICAISE'S concession at Kissassi. While the Louise Marie was anchored, TOWL went ashore and convinced MAYORE, his former ally, to return to Boké where a palaver would resolve the dispute between him and the traders (85).

At Boké, the following day, MAYORE refused to parley and instead greeted the Belgian warship with a large armed force. VAN HAVERBEKE ignored the presence of the Landuman army, landed troops, took possession of BICAISE'S abandoned factory which was located on a knoll commanding an excellent view of the town. BICAISE warned the messengers sent from MAYORE that unless TAL'S son and wife were released all traders would withdraw from Landuman Country. This was a rather empty threat since only BRAITHWAITE and MARTIN remained above the Sacred Grove. VAN HAVERBEKE further informed the Landumans that should MAYORE withdraw his protection of European property and thus invite pillage of European stores, such an act would result in European reprisals. After waiting several hours, MAYORE met with the European captains, but he was too drunk « even to speak » (86). TAL'S son and wife were released and the expedition returned to Rapas on February 26. The following day a messenger arrived at Rapas from Boké to demand the return of TAL'S wife and son. TAL, meanwhile, had sought protection at Bel-Air in the factory of Auguste SANTON. A Landuman party of warriors entered Bel-Air, kidnapped the wife and son, and once more returned them to Boké (87).
A few days later, the British Favorite and the French Recherche arrived in answer to earlier appeals of the traders and in response to recently revealed information concerning the Belgian-Towl treaty. On his return to the Rio Nunez early in 1849, Van Haverbeke had stopped at Gorée where he informed Admiral Bouët-Willaumez of the provisions of the accord provisoire obtained the previous year. Du Columbié, an officer on the Louise Marie, remarked in his later account that Bouët-Willaumez at Gorée had informed him of an 1845 Convention between Britain and France which restricted either country from acquiring new territory between the Gambia and Sierra Leone rivers and had implied that France would have long ago obtained a similar treaty of cession in the river had it been possible (88). Commodore Charles Hotham, then visiting at Gorée, learned the provisions of the Belgian treaty from Bouët-Willaumez and relayed this information to Sierra Leone and to the British Foreign Office mentioning the 1845 Convention (89). The governor of Sierra Leone reacted immediately and sent the Favorite to the Rio Nunez to deliver a letter of official protest to Van Haverbeke. The captain of the Favorite cited the Convention, arguing that the Rio Nunez was an area of free trade and, therefore, that the accord was invalid. Van Haverbeke dismissed the protest as irrelevant since Belgium was not a party to the Convention. The Favorite subsequently left the river (90).

In contrast to the British commander, H. de la Toucaye, commander of the Recherche, had been sent to protect French political interests as well as the property of French traders in the river, and as long as the Louise Marie remained in the river, de la Toucaye maintained surveillance. As a result of the reseizure of Tal’s wife and son, the French traders appealed to de la Toucaye for assistance in their recovery and voiced fears, moreover, that Van Haverbeke was planning to secure a treaty of cession with Mayore (91).

Since the Belgian commander had conducted the previous expedition to Boké, Van Haverbeke responded to the latest kidnapping without inviting the participation of de la Toucaye. On March 1, 1849, Van Haverbeke blockaded the river at Rapas and the following day sent Du Columbié to Boké with
instructions to obtain an interview and to negotiate, if possible, a treaty of cession with Mayoré. Van Haverbeke advised Du Columbier to warn Mayoré that should he continue his interruption of trade and his harassment of traders, the Louise Marie would intervene on the trader’s behalf. Du Columbier was furthermore to demand that Tal be permitted to return and to trade freely at Boké, that Tal’s wife and son be sent immediately to Rapas, and that European traders be allowed to resume trade according to former agreements. In effect, Du Columbier was asking for a return to pre-1848 conditions.

The French warship, Recherche, meanwhile, remained anchored at Caniòpe. De la ToCNaye at first was willing to permit Van Haverbeke to resolve the conflict between Mayoré and the traders—especially since Van Haverbeke had not requested his aid—but when the French traders informed him that Du Columbier had gone to Boké to negotiate for a treaty of cession, he immediately sent a letter to the Belgian commander informing him that he intended to send a detachment to Rapas as a show of support for the French traders. Van Haverbeke, therefore, invited De la ToCNaye to join in any future action against Mayoré.

Meanwhile, Du Columbier’s meeting with Mayoré was partially successful. While Mayoré refused to consider signing a treaty of cession with the Belgian government, he did agree to Du Columbier’s demands that Tal’s son and wife be released and that traders be permitted to return to Boké. Du Columbier subsequently returned to Rapas. Mayoré was in all likelihood playing for time, for the rainy season would begin within the month and few naval captains would willingly submit their crews to the “Nunez fever” which would soon follow. With the warships gone, Mayoré could return to his former policy. Moreover, Mayoré neutralized opposition from the new Fula governor, Madju, by offering a bribe which the latter accepted. Madju could scarcely oppose Mayoré because only 150 Fula warriors had accompanied him from the Futa.

By March 11, neither of the warships had unanchored from Rapas nor had Tal’s wife and son arrived at Rapas. As a result, De la ToCNaye and Van Haverbeke launched a combined expedition against Mayoré, this time led by the Recherche. The
allied expedition landed a large force at Boké on March 12 and
again occupied Bicaise’s factory. Neither side opened fire and
Bicaise, as the spokesman of the traders, went to Mayoré’s com-
pound to ask that he call a palaver. At the subsequent meeting,
Mayoré, in the presence of the Fula governor, promised to send
Tal’s son downstream once the men-of-war were out of Landu-
man waters but demanded that his wife remain at Boké. Madju
testified that Tal had insulted Mayoré and that Mayoré had
tried to maintain friendly relations with the traders. Later that
evening Madju came to Bicaise’s factory informing the allied
commanders that Mayoré had refused to pay the promised bribe;
Madju now volunteered the services of his small force of 150
warriors. The commanders, however, were not prepared to launch
an attack upon Mayoré nor were they impressed by the meager
addition of 150 warriors. Consequently, they left Boké the next
day with the Fula governor in company and retired to Rapas to
await the arrival of Tal’s son. Upon reaching Rapas the command-
ders found that a second French warship had entered the river—
the Prudent under the command of Charles de Kerhallet (96).

When Tal’s son was not conveyed to Rapas by the morning
of March 15, 1849, de la Tocnaye and van Havereke sent
a letter to Boké requesting an explanation and warning that if the
wife and son were not released within 48 hours a state of war
would exist (97). Mayoré replied that he had made no such
promise and that his dispute with Tal was purely a Landuman
matter which in no way reflected his attitude toward the trading
community. Mayoré agreed, however, to send the boy to Rapas as
soon as possible (98).

The commanders also sent a letter to Braithwaite and Mar-
tin and informed them that, for their own safety, they should with-
draw to Rapas within 48 hours or face the possibility of damage
to their factory and stores should warfare commence against
Mayoré. Braithwaite and Martin replied that since it had
taken a full week to transport their merchandise from Kissasi to
Boké, the 48 hour deadline would force them to abandon their
stores and the Landumans would certainly take advantage of
such a windfall and pilage their merchandise (99).

The presence of Braithwaite and Martin at Boké presented
the Belgian and French commanders with a special problem.
Even though they had joined with Mayoré in his dispute with the Association of Traders, they were British subjects and any inadvertent destruction or damage of British property might be interpreted in London as an attack by France upon British trade in West Africa. Britain and France in 1849 were not on the best of terms concerning Continental matters, and an incident in Africa might inflame an already strained relationship. De la Toïnaye realized this and in a report to Governor Pine of Sierra Leone reminded him that Britain and France were allies in Africa regardless of the contemporary state of European politics (100).

Mayoré's uncooperative stance signalled the end of the negotiating phase and resulted in a decision by the commanders "to finish it [the affair]" (101). They including the Fula governor, decided to remove Mayoré and replace him with Tongo who would then establish his capital at Boké. The commanders, in effect, had returned to a formula suggested by De Villeneuve and Lysaght in 1846 which had been blocked by the Fula governor. When informed of their decision, Tongo willingly agreed to these conditions, and the commanders sent a letter to Bonchey of the Simo Society informing him of their intentions. As a result of this array of forces opposing Mayoré, Bonchey joined the allies and declared in favor of Tongo (102).

The preparations for possible warfare in the upper river confronted Lamina Towli with a dilemma. In 1846 Lamina had openly supported Mayoré in the chieftaincy dispute, and the possibility of Tongo's return to power threatened Towli's position in the middle river. With Tongo's capital at Boké and with the backing of the Fula governor, Tongo would control the major arteries of commerce with the interior. Lamina also must have considered that Tongo might attempt to repay him for his earlier alliance with Mayoré. As a result, when De la Toïnaye and Van Haverbeke applied for Nalu assistance in the third expedition to Boké, Lamina declined. Instead, he promised to defend the property of traders at Rapas from an unlikely surprise Landuman attack while the warships were absent upstream (103).

On March 22 the allied expedition left Rapas for Boké and met their first opposing force at Kanduma, a village belonging to
Chief Dibby, an ally of Mayoré. They shelled the town for several hours. In their retreat upstream the Landumans fired the dry grasses. The next day the commanders joined forces with Tongo and his allies at Kissassi, and Tongo agreed to advance along the banks and provide protection to the vessels from the shore. By midday, March 24, the expedition reached Boké where they found the Landumans already positioned on Bicaire's property. The Belgian and French commanders, therefore, commenced a bombardment of the town in support of an attack by Tongo's allies and landed troops. Even though the expeditionary forces were aided by the warriors of the Fula governor, they failed to seize Boké and decided to retire with Madju in company to Rapas where they would formally proclaim Tongo the legitimate ruler of the Landumans (104).

Arriving at Rapas on March 26, the commanders were surprised to discover that Tongo now refused to accept the election until Lamina and the Nalus renounced Mayoré and agreed to support him in any war against his brother. The commanders and Madju, therefore, called a palaver which was held within a few days and was attended by the Belgian and French officers, the traders, Tongo, the Fula governor, Boncheny, and Nalu and Landuman chiefs. Lamina and Yura Towle expressed particular concern that Tongo might hold them responsible for his dispute with Mayoré, but, having obtained assurance from both Tongo and the Fula governor, they renounced their support to Mayoré and promised to defend Tongo against him. Tongo, thereupon, accepted the appointment and the head of the Sirno Society proclaimed him the new ruler (105).

Both de la Tochnaye and Van Haverbeke signed treaties with Tongo on April 5, 1849. The Belgian treaty recognized Tongo as the legitimate ruler of the Landumans and obtained a cession of both banks of the river in Landuman Country, thereby acquiring control from Victoria to Boké. Tongo promised to protect the property of traders and to guarantee open trade in the river (106). Van Haverbeke concluded a second agreement with Tongo which ceded to Belgium approximately 10 acres on the outskirts of Boké. In return, Tongo was to receive an annual custom of 30 dollars from the Belgian government (107). The French treaty of the same date enumerated the rights of
French traders and stipulated a monthly custom of 20 dollars which would be paid to TONGA. France also obtained a cession of approximately 10 acres on the outskirts of Boké and the right to station a garrison at Boké to protect French commerce (108). VAN HAVERBEKE and DE LA TOCNAYE then signed a "private convention". If France stationed a garrison of troops at Boké within one year and thereby guaranteed uninterrupted trade to future Belgian factories between Victoria and Rapas, the cession of the river's banks above Rapas to Belgium would become invalid. In any case, the cession of 10 acre plots to both Belgium and France would remain. VAN HAVERBEKE left the river soon thereafter (109).

During the March 24-25 attack on Boké, the expeditionary force had shelled the store of BRAITHWAITE and MARTIN and, before leaving the river, DE LA TOCNAYE sent a letter to Governor PINE at Freetown on April 2 to explain the purpose of the most recent expedition. On the same day BRAITHWAITE and MARTIN also sent a letter to PINE claiming a violation of their rights and demanding that Britain intervene to protect British interests in the river area. Since the letters contradicted each other in most details, PINE dispatched H.M.S. Seadark under Captain MONEYPENNEY to the Rio Nunez to investigate the incident. MONEYPENNEY obtained statements from BRAITHWAITE, MARTIN, BICAISE, and John HOLEMAN, a minor trader from the Rio Pongo who had moved to the Nunez in 1841. BRAITHWAITE claimed that they had not received adequate warning of the attack on Boké and had lost their factory and merchandise as a result. BICAISE, who had accompanied the Belgian and French expedition, asserted the opposite and claimed that BRAITHWAITE and MARTIN had advised MAYORE on military strategy during the campaign. MONEYPENNEY concluded that there was not enough proof to substantiate the statements of either BICAISE or BRAITHWAITE and MARTIN (110).

The departure of all European warships and of the French traders by the beginning of the 1849 rainy season removed the major force supporting TONGO as king, and anarchy returned to the upper river. MAYORE remained in control of Boké and his ally, Chief DIBBY, held both banks of the river below Kacundy town where TONGO had established his capital. With trade
now halted in the upper river, the Alimamy of Timbo ordered MADJU to call a new palaver and to end the continuing dispute between MAYORE and TONGO before the 1849-50 trading season began. MAYORE answered MADJU's summons by informing the governor that he would have him killed if he entered Boké. As a result of this rebuff, MADJU once more declared TONGO the legitimate ruler. The advent of the 1849 rainy season, however, forestalled any Fula expedition into the river and MADJU returned to the Futa (111).

LAMINA meanwhile interpreted TONGO'S alliance with the Fula governor as dangerous to his own position in the river. Since 1843 TONGO and LAMINA had been inveterate enemies. Should a new Fula governor with a large garrison arrived at Kacundy at the beginning of the 1849-50 trading season, TONGO would command the strength necessary not only to reunite Landuman Country but perhaps enough to launch a war against the Nalus of the middle river. MAYORE offered LAMINA his only hope. Therefore, soon after MADJU left the river, LAMINA disavowed his earlier agreement to defend TONGO and sent an armed force under his brother YURA to Boké to protect MAYORE (112). By openly supporting MAYORE, LAMINA invited reprisals from the French, the Belgians, and certainly from the Fula who had favored TONGO, but he gambled that TONGO would be overthrown before Fula or European intervention could occur. LAMINA, nonetheless, moved much of his personal property from the Nunez to the Congoni River where he could flee should his plan be unsuccessful. By the end of 1849, trade throughout the river was at a standstill with most French traders refusing to return to the upper river where anarchy invited pillage of their stores.

Early in 1850 Governor MACDONALD of Sierra Leone, at the urging of resident British traders in the middle river, sent Benjamin CAMPBELL, then living on the Iles de Los, to meet separately with LAMINA, MAYORE, TONGO, and MADJU, who had recently arrived at Kacundy without an accompanying Fula army, to ascertain whether they would accept the mediation of the Sierra Leone government. MACDONALD took this action because he believed that the French or Belgians would soon intervene (113). CAMPBELL'S mission was a success, and on February 22,
1850, MacDonald dispatched H.M. Gunboat _Teazer_ under the command of Lieutenant Selwyn to the Rio Nunez. MacDonald was determined to avoid a repetition of the Albert incident of 1844 and included 70 men of the 3rd West India Regiment in the vessel's complement. Assistant Staff Surgeon Watson of the colony and Benjamin Campbell were to serve as the government's commissioners or representatives at the negotiations (114).

The _Teazer_ anchored at Capirope on February 24, 1850, and the commissioners sent word for Lamina to meet them at Rapas on March 1 for a palaver. The commissioners then proceeded to Rapas where they established their headquarters at the factory belonging to John Bicaise. Bicaise informed them of the situation in the upper river, noting that Lamina's army was then at Boké in support of Mayore. Campbell sent letters to Mayore, Madju and Tongo inviting them to attend a new conference at Rapas. Mayore indicated his willingness to attend the conference, but Madju refused, claiming that Lamina had threatened to kill any Fula entering Nalu country. Lacking the support of a Fula escort, Tongo also refused the invitation (115).

On March 28 and after a delay of several weeks during which Mayore and Lamina plotted to use the presence of the _Teazer_ to their own advantage, Lamina arrived at Rapas. Lamina professed neutrality in the Tongo-Mayore dispute, and the British commissioners proposed a treaty which would protect legitimate commerce in the middle river and nullify the treaty of cession signed between Lamina and Van Haverbeke in 1848. The proposed treaty recognized Lamina's sovereignty in the middle river and his right to collect customs. Even though such a treaty marked a departure from former British policy of refusing to recognize Lamina and was to Lamina's advantage, Lamina delayed signing the treaty until Mayore arrived at Rapas, claiming that the treaty would be meaningless until the Landuman chieftaincy dispute was resolved (116).

Later that evening Mayore arrived from Boké, and the conciliatory tone of the conference vanished. On his way downstream Mayore and his armed guard of 400 to 500, some belonging to Lamina, attacked Kacundy town and several villages loyal to Tongo. By these acts he precipitated the warfare which
the commissioners had attempted to forestall. LAMINA now declared the Nahus totally in support of MAYORE’s claim to the chieftaincy and demanded that TONGO and the Fula leave the river. He further threatened to blockade the river for 12 years unless Britain recognize MAYORE as the legitimate ruler (117).

LAMINA hoped a successful attack upon Kacundy and his threat to block British commerce would persuade the British to declare their support for MAYORE’s candidacy. His scheme backfired, however, and the British Commissioners left for Kacundy on March 1, 1850, to consult with TONGO and MADJU, the Fula governor. MADJU declared himself the official representative of both the Alimany of Timbo and the Chief of Labé in the Rio Nunez. He declared Chiefs DIBBY, MAYORE, and LAMINA TOWL in rebellion against the Fula and demanded that they leave the river (118). Clearly, with MAYORE and his army at Rapas, the Fula had obtained paramount influence above the Sacred Grove and now were determined to re-establish Fula suzerainty in the middle river as well. The commissioners returned to Rapas.

At Rapas, MAYORE informed the commissioners that it was TONGO rather than himself, as TONGO had claimed, who was the son of a slave and therefore ineligible to rule. In response to this charge, the commissioners returned to Kacundy on March 4 to consult with BONCHENY of the Simo Society concerning TONGO’s legitimacy. With BONCHENY’s assurance, the commissioners, as representatives of the Sierra Leone government, formally recognized TONGO as ruler of the Landumans and offered to sign a treaty regulating British trade. TONGO refused, however, until his dispute with MAYORE and LAMINA had been settled, perhaps believing that CAMPBELL would order the Teazer into battle against his opponents. The strong positions adopted by both LAMINA and MADJU precluded any early return to normal commerce. Without having obtained the treaties which would protect British property in the river and refusing to remove DIBBY, LAMINA, and MAYORE by force, the commissioners left the river on March 7 (119).

In the report of the commissioners to Governor MACDONALD on April 15, 1850, Benjamin CAMPBELL included copies of the treaties signed by TONGO with the Belgian and French commu-
ders. CAMPBELL placed the major blame for the three-year war in the river on the Belgian and French treaties of 1848 and 1849 which had recognized LAMINA’s claim to the middle river and granted him a role in Landuman politics. CAMPBELL concluded that two equal rulers—Nalu and Landuman—should not have been permitted in the Rio Nunez and that had the power of LAMINA been reduced, as in the 1844 incident with H.M.S. Albert, the chieftaincy dispute between TONGO and MAYORE would have resolved itself much earlier without European intervention. As a way for reducing the effectiveness of the French and Belgian treaties, CAMPBELL suggested that Britain negotiate directly with the Alimamy of Timbo for a treaty of cession of the Rio Nunez. Meanwhile, resident agents or consuls of all European countries who had nationals in the river should be established in the Rio Nunez (120).

Governor MACDONALD of Sierra Leone was critical of the commissioners’ recommendations, for Britain since 1838 had been following a policy of acquiring new territory only from areas contiguous existing British colonies. While the British were concerned about French and Belgian designs in the Rio Nunez, prospects were slight that the Colonial Office would consider CAMPBELL’s solution (121).

Because of the importance of the commissioners’ visit to the Rio Nunez, accounts of their activities were sent immediately to Admiral BOUET-WILLIAMZ at Goree. An unidentified French trader at Rapas sent the first on March 6, and the author blamed Lamina Towt for the continuing warfare in the upper river (122). The second letter came from Lamina Towt. LAMINA claimed that CAMPBELL had attempted to obtain a new treaty and had recognized TONGO as ruler without consulting the Landuman chiefs. In reminding BOUET-WILLIAMZ of the treaty which France had signed with him a few years earlier, he indirectly solicited the protection of France in any forthcoming contest between himself and Great Britain (123).

Before a warship of either France or Britain again entered the river, a new Fula governor, the brother of the Alimamy of Timbo, arrived in the upper Nunez with a large army of Fula warriors and any possibility of MAYORE overthrowing TONGO vanished. The Fula governor immediately declared an end to all warfare.
in Landuman Country and ordered all Landuman chiefs, including Tongo, Mayorè, and Dibey, to a new conference. To have refused would have brought immediate reprisals; as a result, all parties attended. The Fula governor declared Tongo the legitimate ruler and Boké the political capital (124). The continuing chieftaincy dispute between Tongo and Mayorè and frequent interruptions in commerce had finally forced the Fula to impose an occupation of Landuman Country and a forceful reinstatement of Fula sovereignty in the river.

To resolve the existing strained relations between the British and the political leadership of the river and perhaps to determine the future of the treaties signed earlier with French and Belgian authorities, Tongo and Bonchény, at Fula insistence, addressed a letter of Governor Macdonald in October 1850 requesting that a representative of the Sierra Leone government come to Boké to mediate between the Nalus and the Landumans and to sign a new treaty. The new Fula governor apparently was not as opposed to Lamina had been his predecessor. Tongo also invited the traders to return to Landuman Country and, as a further enticement to British mediation, suggested that he would allow schools to be built in the upper river (125).

Macdonald refused to act on Tongo’s appeal until late February 1851 when he received a communication from the Colonial Office supporting the conduct of the previous mission led by Benjamin Campbell (126). Macdonald formed a new commission, again led by Campbell, and early in March 1851 the mission left Freetown for the Rio Nunez on board H.M. Paddle Sloop Volcano (127). Campbell signed treaties with Tongo and Lamina on March 19, and March 21, 1851, respectively. These treaties recognized the legitimacy of each ruler over the sections of the river which they then occupied, and, in return, Tongo and Lamina promised free and uninterrupted trade, granted ‘most favored nation’ treatment to Britain, recognized the British government’s right to establish a resident consul in the river, and granted extraterritoriality to resident British traders. Neither chief was to receive any remuneration from the British government. The commissioner, believing they had protected British commerce against further French and Belgian encroachments, then left the river (128). A few months later Lord Palmerston
of the Foreign Office approved the Nunez treaties and promised to send an agent « shortly » (129).

This period of sporadic warfare from 1838 to 1850 between Nalus and Landumans was characterized by significant political and commercial change. Salifu M.A. Towl and Lamina Towl (among the Nalus) and Sarah, Tonga, and Mayore (among the Landuman) had disrupted commerce but none were able to control it. Instead, their harassment of the British and French trading communities and numerous wars in the upper river brought recurrent intervention by squadron vessels of several European nations. Frequent closing of the path also brought a forceful reinstatement of Fula suzerainty. Faced by the overwhelming military superiority of the Europeans and the Fula, the chiefs sought to neutralize outside influence by signing worthless treaties and by dividing the commercial communities. Whenever European warships left or the Fula governor and garrison failed to arrive, their contests for political power and control of commerce resumed. Only late in the period did the chiefs attempt to use treaty negotiations and the commercial interests of the British, French, and Belgians as pawns against their opponents. The Fula intervention in 1850 halted these maneuvers and forced contending parties to accept a political division of the river as of 1850 in addition to the suzerainty of the Fula over all coastal affairs.


NOTES


(4) Watt, "Journal", 6-8, 11, 40, 70; Francis B. SPILSBURY, Account of a Voyage to the West Coast of Africa (London, 1805), 25; Adam Afzelius to T.F. Forster, Jr, May 16, 1798, ADD MSS 12131, British Museum.


(6) See Antoine M.J. DEMOUGEOT, Notes sur ’organisasion politique et administrative de Labe avant et depuis l’occupation franfois (Paris, 1944), for the role of Labe in Nunez policies.

(7) Butcher to Secretary, October 22, 1811, CAI/E2/103, Church Missionary Society, London (hereafter cited CMS); Renner to Bickersteth, October 26, 1816, CAI/E5/2, CMS; Findlay to Hay, March 20, 1832, C0267/114, PRO, and enclosure David Wilson to Serjeant, October 25, 1831.

(8) Captain BELCHER, "Extracts from Observations on Various Points of the West Coast of Africa, Surveyed by His Majesty’s Ship Aetna, in 1830-32", Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, II (1832), 282, 288; Findlay to Hay, July 2, 1832, CO267/115, PRO. Proctor was known as Progot in the Nunez.


(10) The Trials of the Slave Traders (London, 1813), 19.

(11) Findlay to Hay, March 4, 1833, CO267/119, PRO.

(12) René CALVILL, Travels through Central Africa to Timbuctoo, I (London, 1830) 150.

(13) Events later proved this to be the case. See Logbook of H.M. Paddle Steam Vessel Albert, entries dated February 11, 18 and 21, 1844, ADM31/3549, PRO; DE KERHALLET, "Rio Nunez", 198.


(17) Commissions General Report, January 5, 1835, E5374/166, PRO; Folio 13-G-1, p. 155, Archives d’Afrique Occidentale Francaise, Dakar, Senegal, (hereafter cited AAOF). The author is indebted to George R. Grocock, Jr. who microfilmed these dispatches from AAOF and made them available in this research.


(20) Ibid.
(22) DE KERHALLET, "Le Rio Nunez", 197-98.
(23) Lieutenant JOHN HILL to Rear Admiral, April 5, 1839, enclosed in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, November 18, 1839, CO267/155/Offices, PRO.
(25) Lieutenant JOHN HILL to Rear Admiral, April 5, 1839, enclosed in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, November 18, 1839, CO267/155/Offices, PRO; Admiralty to Colonial Office, April 15, 1839, and enclosures, CO267/155/Offices, PRO.
(27) MACAULAY to BATHURST, July 4, 1826, CO267/72/57, PRO.
(28) Lieutenant JOHN HILL to Rear Admiral, April 5, 1839, enclosed in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, November 18, 1839, CO267/155/Offices, PRO.
(29) Ibid.; Admiralty to Colonial Office, April 15, 1839, and enclosures, CO267/155/Offices, PRO.
(30) Foreign Office to Colonial Office, November 18, 1839, and enclosures, CO267/155/Offices, PRO; WILLIAM BULL to WILLIAM ONDERDONK, January 26, 1839, Bull-Onderdonk Letters, Nassau County Museum, New York.
(33) Ibid.; Admiral to Colonial Office, April 5, 1839, enclosed in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, November 18, 1839, CO267/155/Offices, PRO. Benjamin Campbell had operated a factory on the Iles de Los and had received his training in factory management as an employee of Macaulay and Babington, a Freetown-based firm. Campbell also had served briefly on the Governor's Council in 1821. He traded in both the Nunez and Pongo rivers after financial failure at Freetown. Not until 1839 did Campbell establish factories at Rapas and at Kissassi. See FYFE, Sierra Leone, 205, and Hill to Rear Admiral, April 5, 1839, enclosed in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, November 18, 1839, CO267/155/Offices, PRO, for Campbell.
(34) Ibid.; Admiral to Colonial Office, April 5, 1839, enclosed in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, November 18, 1839, CO267/155/Offices, PRO. There is a three-day discrepancy in the record. Hill reported his arrival at Kacundy on March 30 but signed the treaty on March 27.
(36) Ferguson letter, quoted in Buxton, African Slave Trade, 383-84.
(37) Ibid.
(38) Folio 13-G-1, p. 162, AAOF.
(39) PROCTOR to GLENIEG, January 5, 1839, and June 7, 1839, CO267/157/Individually, PRO.
(40) Letter to RUSSELL, March 4, 1841, CO267/165/24, PRO; CAR to RUSSEL, August 16, 1841, and minutes, CO267/165/52, PRO.
(43) Foreign Office to Colonial Office, February 1, 1841, CO267/177/Offices, PRO; DE KERHALLET, "Le Rio Nunez", 199.
(44) DEMOUGEOT, "Histoire du Nunez", 204; "Enoch Richmond Ware's Voyage to Africa, 1840-1841", in New England Merchants, ed. by Newman R. BENNETT and George E. BROOKS, Jr., 293.
Foreign Office to Colonial Office, February 1, 1841, CO267/177/Office, PRO; de Kerhallet, "Le Rio Nunez", 195.


(47) Ibid., 286.

(48) Ibid.

(49) Ibid.

(50) Folio 13 G 4, p. 165-66, AAOF. This treaty was signed by de Langlois, La Porte, J. Crespin, Pierre d’Emerville, Andrew Coulbro, A. Nomar, E. Anthony, Bocaille, Bouchaine, Anvel, French, Lemaire, Cattin, and Yonna. See also DEMOUGEOT, "Histoire du Nunez", 205; AIRCIN, Guinee, 286.

(51) Admiralty to Colonial Office, August 5, 1843, CO267/182/Office, PRO.


(53) DEMOUGEOT, "Histoire du Nunez", 205; du COLOMBIER, "Expedition franco-belge", 185. Most authors writing in French describe Tongo and Mayore as nephews of Sarah, ruler of the Landumans from 1838 to 1844. The Landumans early in the nineteenth century followed matrilineal descent patterns. By late in the century, however, the royal families followed patrilineal descent when selecting rulers. If Tongo and Mayore were in fact nephews of Sarah, their descent may be as described in (1) or (2) below: A = Sarah, B = Tongo, C = Mayore, M = male, F = female.

(1) F ——— A ——— M
   \            /     \       /
   B ——— C ——— F

(2) F ——— A ——— M ——— F
   \            /     \       /
   B ——— C ——— F

(1) Describes matrilineal descent. Sources, however, note that either Tongo or Mayore was a son of a slave. It is highly unlikely that Sarah’s sister was permitted to dilute the royal bloodline by marrying a slave. Matrilineal descent, therefore, must be dismissed as a possible explanation.

(2) Patrilineal descent, is also unlikely. For kingship to pass through all male siblings of a generation was common practice among the Landumans. Apparently, however, Sarah was the last of his generation and would have passed rule to his sons, unless he had no sons and was forced to look among the sons of his brothers for his successors. Since Sarah is known to have produced daughters, it is most unlikely that he failed to also produce sons.

The most probable explanation is that both Tongo and Mayore were sons of Sarah. The Landuman royalty was in a process of transition from matrilineal to patrilineal descent. Sarah’s sons were called nephews, therefore, to guarantee their acceptability by the general Landuman population.

(54) Logbook of H.M. Paddle Steam Vessel Albert, entries dated January 14 to 31, ADM51/3549, PRO.

(55) Ibid.
(56) Ibid., entries dated January 30, 1844, to February 3, 1844.
(57) Ibid., entries dated February 6 and 23, 1844, and March 2 to 5, 1844.

(58) Ibid., entries dated March 7, 9 and 18, 1844; DE KERHALLET, "Le Rio Nunez", 199.


(64) Ibid.

(65) Ibid.

(66) Ibid.


(69) Ibid., "Report", 30-31; Logbook of H.M. Steam Vessel Grappler, entries dated February 7 to 17, 1848, ADM53/2594, PRO.

(70) LYSAGHT, "Report", 30-31; DEMOUGEOT, "Histoire du Nunez", 209; Logbook of H.M. Steam Vessel Grappler, entry dated February 18, 1848, ADM53/2594, PRO.

(71) Folio 13-G-4, p. 171-72, AASOF; Fernand ROUGET, La Guinee (Creste, 1906), 14-15, incorrectly reports the date of this treaty as July 27, 1848.


(74) Ibid., "Report", 30; BICAISE undoubtedly played some part in the negotiations between van Haverbeke and Lamina. Official Belgian documents, unseen by this author, apparently depict him as initiating the negotiations. In 1850 the Belgian government conferred the Order of Leopold upon Bicaise in gratitude for his assistance to van Haverbeke during the attack upon Boko. See MASSINON, "L’Entreprise du Rio Nunez", 394.


(76) Ibid., "Report", 30; BICAISE undoubtedly played some part in the negotiations between van Haverbeke and Lamina. Official Belgian documents, unseen by this author, apparently depict him as initiating the negotiations. In 1850 the Belgian government conferred the Order of Leopold upon Bicaise in gratitude for his assistance to van Haverbeke during the attack upon Boko. See MASSINON, "L’Entreprise du Rio Nunez", 394.
(87) Folio FG6/8, no. 40, p. 3, AAOF; Braithwaite and Martin to Pine, April 25, 1849, enclosed in Pine to Grey, May 2, 1849, CO267/207/36, PRO.


(89) Foreign Office to Colonial Office, and enclosures, July 28, 1849, CO267/211/offices, PRO. The French and Belgian sources mention an agreement of May 29, 1845, which was to be renewable in ten years. The British Foreign and Colonial Offices later claimed that no such "Convention" existed.

(90) Du Colombier, "Expédition franco-belge", 194-95. No British record of the Favorite being in the river at this time has been found thus far in this research.

(91) Ibid., 197-98; Demoügot, "Histoire du Nunez", 219; Maroy, "La colonie belge", 18.

(92) Ibid., 197-98; Demoügot, "Histoire du Nunez", 219; Maroy, "La colonie belge", 18.

(93) Ibid., 197-98; Demoügot, "Histoire du Nunez", 219; Maroy, "La colonie belge", 18.

(94) Ibid., 197-98; Demoügot, "Histoire du Nunez", 219; Maroy, "La colonie belge", 18.

(95) Ibid., 197-98; Demoügot, "Histoire du Nunez", 219; Maroy, "La colonie belge", 18.

(96) Ibid., 197-98; Demoügot, "Histoire du Nunez", 219; Maroy, "La colonie belge", 18.

(97) Folio FG6/8, no. 42, AAOF.

(98) Monheim, L'Afrique, 22.

(99) Folio FG6/8, no. 42, AAOF.

(100) Monheim, L'Afrique, 22.

(101) Monheim, L'Afrique, 22.

(102) Ibid., 23; Du Colombier, "Expédition franco-belge", 203; Demoügot, "Histoire du Nunez", 221.


(104) Ibid., 25-27; Du Colombier, "Expédition franco-belge", 204-14; Demoügot, "Histoire du Nunez", 221-22. Detailed descriptions of the battle at Boldé are also found in Folio FG6/8, no. 57, AAOF.


(109) Massinon, "L'Entreprise du Rio Nunez", 526; Folio FG6/8, no. 55, AAOF.

(110) Pine to Grey, May 2, 1849, and enclosures, OW267/207/36, PRO; Logbook of H.M.S. Sceptre, entries dated April 21 to 27, 1849, ADM103/3/150, PRO.

(111) Commissioner's report, March 13, 1850, enclosed in MacDonald to Grey, August 4, 1850, CO267/215/93, PRO.

(112) Ibid.

(113) MacDonald to Grey, March 2, 1850, CO267/215/26, PRO.

(114) Ibid.

(115) MacDonald to Grey, August 4, 1850, and enclosures CO267/215/93, PRO.

(116) Ibid.

(117) Ibid.
(118) Ibid.
(119) Ibid.; Logbook of H.M. Gunboat Teazer, ADM53/1575, PRO. For a French analysis of British aims in the river, see Folio FG6/8, nos. 68 and 69, AAOF.
(120) Commissioner's report, March 13, 1850, enclosed in MacDonald to Grey, August 4, 1850, CO267/215/93, PRO.
(121) MacDonald to Grey, August 4, 1850, CO267/215/93, PRO.
(122) Folio FG6/8, no. 69, AAOF.
(123) Folio FG6/8, no. 71, AAOF.
(124) MacDonald to Grey, November 28, 1850, CO267/217/133, PRO.
(125) King Tongo and Chief Boucheny to MacDonald, October 21, 1850, enclosed in Ibid.
(126) MacDonald to Grey, April 6, 1851, CO267/220/75, PRO.
(127) Ibid.; Logbook of H.M. Paddle Sloop Volcano, ADM31/4377, PRO.
(128) MacDonald to Grey, April 6, 1851, and enclosures, CO267/220/75, PRO; Sir Samuel Rowe, "Memorandum on the Mellicourie and Other Rivers to North of Sierra Leone", (Colonial Library, London; West African pamphlets, N° 5, 1879), 2-3.
(129) Weddington to Melville, June 34, 1851, enclosed in Foreign Office to Colonial Office, June 34, 1851, CO267/223/Offices, PRO.
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