THE BALTIMORE/PONGO CONNECTION:
AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURISM, COLONIAL EXPANSIONISM, OR AFRICAN OPPORTUNISM?

By Bruce L. Mouser

From the beginning of the republic, American interests covered all of Africa's western coast. Its principal commerce, however, focused upon a section bordered by the Gambia River to the north and Cape Palmas to the south. Nowhere was that influence greater than in the Rio Nunez to Iles de Los region of present Guinea-Conakry. For this limited area, a prominent American presence was accepted by the British between 1794 and 1818. In the early 1820s, however, after the American Colonization Society had established a settlement at what was to become Liberia, the British began to see American actions in settling free and freed African-Americans as part of a covert attempt to undercut British power and influence at Sierra Leone and to weaken British control over its own African-American settlers and commerce. As a result, the British accused American commercial and emigrationist interests of planning outright encirclement and subversion.

This study explores a scheme by Baltimore-based abolitionists, emigrationists, and business interests after 1820 to establish an exclusive monopolistic relationship with some commercial and political leaders in the area of the Pongo and Nunez rivers. It examines, too, the objectives in and objection toward such a relationship from peoples based on the African side of the Atlantic basin. The failure of an exclusive commercial arrangement between its proponents, on both sides of the Atlantic, essentially reflected poor planning, missed opportunities, unclear or unrealistic objectives by those involved, reliance on the success of too few persons, and concrete opposition and maneuvering from British officials on the African coast.¹

¹ I am indebted to Victoria Bomba Coifman and George E. Brooks, who read earlier drafts of this paper and made helpful suggestions. Note: Historians, like those enthusiasts of puzzles, are often confronted with bits and pieces that, while creating interesting sub-pictures, seemingly defy membership in the whole because important bonding pieces are missing or questionable. Without a clear picture for guidance, a historian is asked to determine whether pieces, threads, and bits belong to the whole because of placement, composition, timeliness, and texture and to frame the composition in a form acceptable to the discipline. Too often, actual pieces are missing in the historian's search, either because they were not kept, were misinterpreted, or simply were not found because the historian was looking in the wrong place. In the instance of this paper, certain pieces or bonding threads for this puzzle are clearly missing or tenuous, but it is the opinion of this author that all those included in this article belong to the same series of events.
Recent literature on the peculiar relationships between African centers and external commercial interests has described them as contrasting and competing frontiers, depending on the perspective of parties involved. Prospects for a defined Baltimore/Pongo relationship in 1823–1830 involved a complex listing of parties and potential frontiers. On the Baltimore side were abolitionists, emigrationists, and commercial interests who perhaps envisioned a second American frontier on the African continent, exclusive of, but not independent from, the American Colonization Society’s efforts at Cape Mesurado on the Grain Coast. For a time these Baltimore-based groups fastened their attention upon a particular region, the Rio Pongo, which enjoyed better contacts with interior markets and more reliable sources for commodities trade than did projected settlement areas in future Liberia. The Pongo region also represented steadier and larger markets for manufactured and processed goods from the U.S. Another group interested in a new Africa-based frontier was composed of African-Americans, potential settlers presumably from Baltimore and those already settled at Freetown and at Cape Mesurado, who might represent Baltimore, American Colonization Society, and other American interests on the Guinea-Conakry coast. These and new settlers essentially would populate an expanded African-American frontier (creating an “Americo-African nation”) and link existing interests to the south with those in the Pongo or Northern Rivers and perhaps absorb Sierra Leone, following long-established commercial links from the earlier slave and commodities trades.

From the African side, three competing frontiers and groups were in play. One group was dominated by African, Euro-African, and European/American traders resident in the Rio Pongo. These merchants perhaps foresaw a restricted market for African commodities on the American side of the Atlantic and a steady source for trade goods from Baltimore at advantageous prices, a trade composed principally of commodities and exclusive in its focus. Any arrangement between Pongo-based merchants and political elites and the Baltimore group would also involve an expansion of the Pongo-based commodities and secondary/imported/smuggled American goods southward toward Freetown and the Sherbro region, and to the newly formed African-American settlements near Monrovia. Reciprocally, an African-American frontier of commerce and influence would expand northward from Monrovia along established and reconnecting lines. Expanding commercial frontiers from the Rio Pongo, from Baltimore, and from the Society’s southern settlement conflicted inevitably with the designs of well-entrenched British commercial and political interests based in Sierra Leone.

In 1822, two apparently unrelated events came together in Baltimore to join various interests, and thus set the stage for the possibility of an exclusive arrangement between Pongo-based and Baltimore-based merchants. Interestingly both

---

events had their origins on Africa’s west coast. The first involved a court case in Baltimore that had its beginnings near Cape Mesurado, where a war in 1821–1822 produced captives who became commodities in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Captain John Chase’s schooner General Páez intercepted the slaver in the Middle Passage and transported the captured slaves to the British West Indies, where he received the assigned bounty per slave found on board. Chase offered employment to fourteen of the freed Africans as members of his crew and proceeded northward to Baltimore to resupply his vessel. Upon entering Baltimore Harbor, however, Chase was charged with failing to pay past debts, apparently to someone in Baltimore, and the General Páez was forced to remain at an anchor until that matter was resolved.

Chase’s problems grew when harbor officials informed persons on shore that Africans were members of the ship’s crew. The presence of Africans among his crew appeared to some to be a clear violation of the Slave Trade Prohibition Act of 1819. That Act required that such persons be taken into custody and their repatriation to Africa be arranged. Those with colonization, abolitionist, and emigration sentiments at Baltimore joined forces to bring the Africans onshore and to the court’s attention and to embroil Captain Chase, the Baltimore court system, and the Maryland Federal District Court in litigation from mid-1822 to late 1823.

The second event at Baltimore that merged with the General Páez incident also involved the slave trade, or the possibility that that might be the case. In 1816 or 1817, a French captain then trading near the Rio Pongo had let it be known there that a new school had opened in the West Indies, and he offered to transport potential students to that school. A principal Susu chief from the Pongo region sent two sons, but he became concerned at the end of four years when he failed to receive information about their circumstances. He recruited Richard Wilkinson of Pallangia in the Rio Pongo to search for them and arrange their speedy return to West Africa.

---


4 [John Shoemaker Tyson], Life of Elisha Tyson, the Philanthropist (Baltimore, 1825), 112. A detailed treatment of Baltimorean participants is included in Bruce L. Mouser, “Baltimore’s African Experiment, 1822–1827,” Journal of Negro History 80, 3 (Summer 1995), 113–30.


7 ACS, Seventh Annual Report ... 1824, 34–35; [Jared Sparks], Review of The Sixth Annual Report of the American Society for Colonizing the Free People of Color, in North American Review 28 (1824), 70.
Wilkinson was an admirable choice for such a task and the Pongo an excellent place to recruit such a person. How better to find a potential slaver than to hire a person knowledgeable in the ways of the trade? The Pongo River had attracted Europeans or Euro-African traders during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but many had come at the beginning of the nineteenth century when several American and British merchants established residence there, married local women, and produced offspring often related to ruling lineages. Wilkinson (1795–1861) was a descendant of a British father and a Baga mother, the latter a member of important Luso-African lineages that included the Gomez and Fernandez branches. A cousin, Jellorum Harrison, had studied in England late in the eighteenth century, had traveled in central Asia as a Christian missionary, and had served as catechist in the Church Missionary Society’s Pongo Mission schools in the early 1810s. Wilkinson received his education in England under the Reverend Thomas Scott before returning to Fallangia in 1813.

Wilkinson accepted the challenge of finding the missing sons partly as an extension to a larger plan that included continuing, once he had found the sons, to Baltimore where he would purchase a cargo of trade goods for his factory at Fallangia in the Rio Pongo. Early in 1823, Wilkinson crossed the Atlantic, found the sons whom the French captain had abandoned, and arranged their return to Africa. From there, Wilkinson proceeded to Baltimore, purchased trade goods, and arranged their transport on the schooner Fidelity, scheduled to leave Baltimore for the African coast early in October. The Fidelity was owned by Jesse Tyson of Baltimore and was under contract to carry emigrants and merchandise to the Society’s settlement at Cape Mesurado.

Wilkinson’s timely arrival in Baltimore at the height of the General Paiez legal proceeding, however, added an ingredient to the expectations of all parties involved in the court case. Those in favor of abolition, emigration, and colonization, and by this time the federal government, were searching for a resolution of that dilemma, any solution that would adhere to provisions of the 1819 Act and remove the African crew members from the United States. By the time Wilkinson arrived in Baltimore, imprecise translations with these Africans had clearly muddled understandings, and the Africans were then asking to remain in the U.S. rather than be repatriated. That Wilkinson spoke English, pidgin English, and four


10 ACS, Seventh Annual Report ... 1824, 35–39.

11 Papers of Jesse Tyson and Sons, MS 2371, Box VII, folio Fidelity, Maryland Historical Society Manuscript Division. Several sources identified the Fidelity as the Society’s packet vessel.
African trade languages (Susu, Baga, Mandingo, Fula) made him an invaluable resource in Baltimore in August-October 1823. Wilkinson acted as interpreter and explained that the Federal Government intended to repatriate them all.

Whether it was the intent of Jesse Tyson, Richard Wilkinson, or the Society's appointed representative, Dr. Eli Ayers, is unclear, but the General Páez incident served as the nexus for a plan to produce a "Baltimore Trading Company." Eventually this would include the firms of Jesse Tyson and Sons, M'Fadon and Harris, Joseph King, Jr., and Thomas Tyson, all acting as Baltimore-based agents for traders wishing to trade to West Africa. The announcement of such a company first appeared in the Federal Gazette (Baltimore) in April 1823, clearly before Wilkinson's arrival on the scene, but after the American Colonization Society had become involved in the incident. Perhaps those involved initially only projected an exclusive monopolistic arrangement with settlers at Cape Mesurado, with Dr. Eli Ayres, the Society's director in Africa, acting as its supercargo or long-term agent.

Wilkinson's arrival and participation in resolving the General Páez misunderstanding expanded the opportunities for all parties involved. Future Baltimore commercial links would include both the American Colonization Society settlement at Mesurado and merchants in the Pongo/Nunez region, where paths into the interior crossed fewer ethnic boundaries and where a powerful Fula state in the interior exercised substantial control over international roads to the coast. Hides, ivory, groundnuts, gold, gum, stock, rice, wax, and perhaps coffee, were plentiful in the rivers and in the interior, and demand for such manufactured goods as cotton cloth, firearms, gunpowder, flour and sundry goods, and tobacco and rum was high and steady on the coast and in the interior. The arrangements for trade between long-distance African traders and coastal-resident merchants were longstanding, and landlord-stranger relationships were well established. Relationships between resident African, Euro-African, and European/American traders and American suppliers/consumers was also ongoing in the Pongo/Nunez, first in slave trading and commodities commerce and by the 1820s almost exclusively in commodities. If a company agency in the Cape Mesurado region would provide

---


13 Navy Correspondence, James Beatty to Samuel Southard, 9 October 1823, roll 2; ACS, Seventh Annual Report ... 1824, 36-37; Alexander, History of Colonization, 163-66; [Sparks], "Review of The Sixth Annual Report," 69-73.

14 Federal Gazette and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, 14 April 1823. Consortiums of this sort were not uncommon in commerce at that time. In this case, the announcement in the Federal Gazette may have represented only an appeal for partners for a single voyage, or it may have signaled the beginning of a definable "company." No data has been located to clarify the arrangements of those who became involved in this venture. The author assumes that the "company" was formed to last for more than a single voyage.

15 In PRO CO267/34/11, Maxwell to Bathurst, 8 May 1812, and CO267/34/24, Maxwell to Bathurst, 25 November 1812, Governor Maxwell reported arrangements between traders in the Pongo/Nunez with named persons at Charleston, Boston, and Baltimore, and at Mantanzas, Cuba.
one zone for merchandising for Baltimore-produced goods, a second agency in
the Pongo/Nunez region could effectively double the Company’s potential
market, perhaps tripling it if larger and wealthier populations and more secure
paths were brought into consideration.

From a Liberian or American Colonization Society perspective, the formation
of a “Baltimore Trading Company” provided new opportunities. Whether Dr.
Ayres linked himself to the fortune of such a company is unclear, but it appears
likely that Jehudi Ashmun, a recent resident of Baltimore who replaced Ayres as
government agent at Monrovia in 1824, saw himself as the Baltimore Trading
Company’s exclusive “agent” on the coast.16 Perhaps Ashmun interpreted his
arrangement with the Company as little more than a personal financial opportu­
nity, but he apparently envisioned possible settlements of repatriated free or freed
African-Americans in the Rio Pongo as physical demonstrations of Monrovian
and Baltimore interests in rivers located north of Sierra Leone.17 This would mean
that the Company’s success would link existing African-Americans from Liberia
with future African-Americans in the Pongo region, with African-American/Nova
Scotian settlers in the Sierra Leone River.

Merchants resident in the Rio Pongo had earlier considered just such an
arrangement with the U.S. According to a later account by Ashmun, a group of
traders in the Pongo, “in conjunction with other influential residents and chiefs,”
had written to the American Colonization Society in 1820 requesting that it send
African-American settlers, but he noted that this request had apparently “miscar­
ried.”18 American residents in the area at that time included Styles Lightburn and
Paul Faber of Charleston and the Curtises of Boston, who formed a marriage alli­
ance with the Kati ruling Susu lineage at Thia.19 Two trade towns near Kissing
where the Curtises held court were called Boston and Charleston, clearly attesting
to their American origins.

Between 1820 and 1823, however, significant change had come to the Pongo.
The Royal Anti-Slavery Squadron had increased patrols north of Sierra Leone,
raided Pongo factories believed to be sites of slave trading, and significantly
increased the risk that its officers would charge Europeans trading in slaves with
piracy. Instead of exclusively exporting slaves, many resident traders subse-

These arrangements included sources for tobacco, rum, dry goods, pine boards, and other goods in
demand in Africa, in return for slaves.

40; Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 87–90, 95. See also Charles Morrow Wilson, Liberia (New York, 1947), 11–14, and R. C. F. Maugham, The Republic of Liberia (New
York, reprint, 1969), 36–53, for brief summaries of Ashmun’s activities before becoming Society
Agent on the coast.

17 Gurley, Life of Jehudi Ashmun, 349; Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement,
87–88, described Ashmun as a person possessed by “a ‘mercantile mania’.”

18 Gurley, Life of Jehudi Ashmun, 349.

19 For background to the arrivals and activities of the Lightburns, Fabers, and Curtises, see
Frontier,” 276–84.
sequently diversified their operations, with several describing themselves as planters or plantation managers, accumulating many slaves and producing such commodities as coffee and groundnuts for export. One trader, for instance, secured a plantation overseer from the French West Indies to help him develop his estate. Most continued to sell surplus or troublesome slaves to shippers, however, when an opportunity occurred and when risk of raids was low. Some "reformed" traders allied themselves with the British and against the Kati-Curtis coalition during the 1820-1823 raids, effectively dividing the river's traders into two camps. One group vocally supported conversion to commodities while the other expected to continue the slave trade. Americans were members of both camps; clearly these alliances were based on more than just national identities.

Interestingly Wilkinson had remained neutral during this early trade dispute, partly because he was related to the ruling lineages of both the Susu and Baga peoples, and partly because neutrality was perhaps a less risky and more profitable stance for the moment. Seizure of the slaver Rosalia in 1822, for instance, had dramatized the risks for slave traders. Two notorious slavers of the upper Rio Pongo, John Ormond, Jr., and Styles Lightburn, subsequently informed Freetown of their intentions to abandon slave trading completely in favor of plantation agriculture in coffee. Others joined the shift to a slave-based plantation system as if in a stampede, at least on the surface. By 1823, Ormond reportedly owned 5,000 to 6,000 slaves, and Lightburn, several thousand.

To be sure, the evolving growth of plantation agriculture in the Pongo afforded new opportunity and challenge, but plantation agriculture itself was not new to this section of the coast. From the late eighteenth century, Susu headmen in Sumbuya, located south of present Conakry, had operated large farms (locally called lugars) where they grew rice for local consumption, for sale to slavers who frequented this coast, and for trade at Freetown once that settlement was established. Fendan Modu Dumbuya of Wonkapong, for example, a major trader and rice producer, owned several villages whose inhabitants were engaged in cloth weaving, salt production, and kola collection. The labor needs of most of these sectors met by slaves or subject/stranger peoples of varying types. A missionary who lived in this area in the early nineteenth century described several of these villages and the anxiety of inhabitants concerning uncertainties that accompanied

---

20 The history of the trade wars in the Pongo and beginnings of plantation agriculture are described in Bruce L. Mouser, "Trade and Politics in the Nunez and Pongo Rivers, 1790-1865" (Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University), 1971, Ch. 4, "The Trade Wars, 1818-1835."


slave status. Susu villages were often segregated, with freemen occupying one village, subject/client peoples another, and slaves still a third. Some slaves were considered workers and were protected by law; others were subject to immediate sale or to the whims of owners. Many workers, even those of free status, were living on and tending land and crops for the lord during a portion of the week, with remaining days available for their own use in a patron/client relationship. This perhaps characterized the majority of those engaged in agriculture, weaving, salt production, or kola collection. Others enjoyed few privileges. Such were the captive slaves who were destined to work in fields while awaiting eager traders from the Atlantic who came to purchase slaves as commodities in exchange for guns, powder, tobacco, and manufactured or processed goods.

The patterns in Sumbuya were well known to Susu ruling elites and traders in the Pongo. Missionaries in the Pongo (1808–1817) described *lugars* used locally in rice production, but their interest focused more on ruling lineages and the activities of slave traders than on domestic slavery or the status of subject peoples or strangers. Rice production required large numbers of workers, some of whom were assuredly of slave status. Those with rights to land and increasingly resident traders kept some slaves ready for market, but they employed others on *lugars* where they were still easily accessible should slave ships enter the river in search of large numbers. This was especially true after 1820 when plantation agriculture expanded to include coffee and later groundnuts or rubber. Traders, both European and those of African or mixed descent, used free labor in their commerce and sometimes slaves as well, and sometimes failed to differentiate clearly between the two. It was, therefore, an easy transition to shift from the *lugars* of subject villages to plantation agriculture because patterns remained very

---

23 CA1/E1/116c, Peter Hartwig’s Journal, Susu Country, CMS, 9 April 1806 to 24 May 1806, entry dated 19 April 1806.


25 These records are found in published and unpublished reports and diaries of Church Missionary Society missionaries. See Mouser, “Trade and Politics in the Nunez and Pongo Rivers,” 83–129.


similar, except that slaves increasingly acquired security in their person and fewer expectations of being sold at coastal factories because their labor was required locally. For some traders, however, the temptation of easy cash for slaves was hard to give up. In consequence, slave trading and plantation agriculture coexisted into the 1840s, until slavers stopped visiting the rivers and markets for other commodities matched former trade values.

Shifting from active slave trading after 1820 to extensive plantation agriculture and from a trader alliance where merchants regularly cooperated to supply large ships with cargos of slaves to a fragmented and competitive commodities commerce brought changes in the system. Perhaps Wilkinson, as a neutral, aggressively supported a close relationship with American merchants. After a few newly arrived African-American immigrants left Fallangia in 1822–1823, even Wilkinson would have realized by the time he reached Baltimore in mid-1823 that it was unlikely that large numbers of African-American settlers would move into the Rio Pongo area, unless these settlers intended to assist in operating a slave-owning system or were willing to work as free labor alongside it.28 Jehudi Ashmun, as government agent at Mesurado, even as late as 1827 continued to support African-American settlement in the Rio Pongo but suggested that it might be "easier and safer to colonize St. John's, than the Pongas."29

Once Wilkinson returned from Baltimore to his factory at Fallangia in December 1823, trade between Pongo merchants and the firms of Jesse Tyson and Sons, M'Fadon and Harris, Joseph King, Jr., and Thomas Tyson, occurred, but perhaps differently than Wilkinson had projected. The contest between trader interests in the Pongo region had escalated during his six-month absence, and on his return Wilkinson was forced to join the Kati-Curtis coalition. In the continuing

28 Information about a landing of African-American immigrants at Fallangia in October 1822 is sparse and is one of those tantalizing but ambiguous puzzle pieces that does not fit easily into the full picture. According to a report in PRO, F084/21, Commissions General #4, 29 April 1823, the author wrote that the ship Dolphin landed an unspecified number of settlers from Charleston who had participated in a disturbance there and noted that these immigrants had all arrived in Freetown by 1823. Certainly this event references the Denmark Vesey rebellion planned at Charleston for the summer of 1822 and the fact that several free African-Americans of that city who were found guilty of participating in its planning were sentenced to transportation to a place outside the United States. That Fallangia was the original landing point is reasonable, considering the long-term relationship that existed between Charleston merchants and planters/slave-owners with Pongo-based suppliers. Styles Lightburn of Fallangia, for instance, came originally from Charleston. Daniel L. Schafer's work on connections between the Pongo and Charleston/Fernandina (East Florida) amply demonstrates that a special relationship existed between merchants/planters on both sides of the Atlantic and that Lightburn was an important player in this relationship. See Schafer, "Family Ties that Bind: Anglo-African Slave Traders in Africa and Florida, John Fraser and his Descendants," Abolition and Slavery 20, 3 (1999), 1–21. Whether these settlers came to Fallangia in response to the letter of 1820 is unclear. For more on the Danish Vesey Rebellion, see Herbert Aptheker, American Slave Revolts (New York, 1943), 266–76; Nicholas Halasz, The Rattling Chains: Slave Unrest and Revolt in the Antebellum South (New York, 1966), 115–34.

29 Gurley, Life of Jehudi Ashmun, 350. In this case, St. John's likely referred to the island of Antigua, in the Leeward Islands of the Caribbean Sea.
war, armed forces of the opposing coalitions battled for control of commerce; when the fighting ended, Wilkinson and Curtis were on the losing side. The winners included other Americans, among them Styles Lightburn, Paul Faber, and the relatives of John Frazer, all of whom would form marriage alliances with all the winners in the Pongo trade frontier and would improve commercial positions in the neighboring Nunez trade as well. These winners, and those principally involved in the Nunez trade, appeared prominently in the manifests of Jesse Tyson and Sons.30 Missing from the record is any later mention of Richard Wilkinson or any indication that the Society considered the possibility of sending African-American settlers to an exclusive Pongo region after 1823.

Meanwhile, British officials at Freetown watched these wars in the Pongo with growing concern. Much of its own settler population had African-American origins, and many of these immigrants had come to Freetown at the turn of the century with nonconformist political and religious ideas.31 The unofficial currency of the Sierra Leone Company before 1808 had been the American dollar.32 During the Franco-British wars at the turn of the century, Americans competed with embattled British suppliers in the Freetown market and often acted as principal suppliers of goods and foods needed by the settlement and colony.33 In 1810 and again in 1812, Paul Cuffe, a successful African-American merchant from Massachusetts, visited Freetown and indicated an interest in moving there with his family and other immigrants. In February 1816 Cuffe returned to Freetown, this time with nine families comprised of 38 people from Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, and with supplies sufficient to build a sawmill. None of these immigrants were skilled laborers, however.34 Cuffe let it be known in his writings that he planned an American settlement at Freetown, one sponsored in

30 Papers of Jesse Tyson and Sons, MS 2371, Box VII, folio Fidelity, Maryland Historical Society—9 December 1823, promissory note; 27 June 1824, list of cargo for the Rio Pongo; n.d., list signed by Henry Jardine; n.d., “List of articles necessary,” signed by Castagnet. Wilkinson’s name appeared in a 6 September 1823 letter, A. D. Hunter to E. B. Caldwell (Records of the ACS, Series 1, reel) in which the author recommended him “as one who might benefit the Colony if employed.”


33 For activities of American traders and merchantmen on the windward coast during this period, see George Brooks, Jr., Yankee Traders, Old Coasters, & African Middlemen (Boston, 1970), 52–65, and Chs. 3–4; Sheldon Harris, “An American’s Impressions of Sierra Leone in 1811,” Journal of Negro History 47 (January 1962), 35–41.

part with funds from the American Congress and one that might eventually transform Sierra Leone into a joint venture, thereby weakening Britain's exclusive control. British officials were clearly aware of Cuffe's design for their colony.

For a time, the newly formed American Colonization Society had considered Sierra Leone as an area for African-American settlement and discussed this possibility with British officials. In 1817, the Society instructed two of its representatives at Freetown, Samuel Mills and Ebenezer Burgess, to "visit [review] the coast above and below the colony of Sierra Leone" as potential areas for settlement, giving particular attention to possible land arrangements in the Sherbro region. The Society's 1818 report included a letter from General Harper of Baltimore in which he reviewed his commitment to the "universal colonization" of free and freed African-Americans on the African coast and to the commercial and egalitarian benefits that would accrue to both African-Americans and to Africans. Harper applauded the successes of the Sierra Leone colony but concluded that a colony in which Caucasian leadership dominated could not serve the objectives of the Society or of African-American settlers. He expressed doubt that the British government would agree to a "union and incorporation" of "republican" American and "imperial" British objectives on the coast.

In particular, Harper believed that the Niger's course and its proximity to the coast should be primary considerations in the placement of African-American settlers. In 1817 Harper identified two rivers as places where "a great [American-sponsored] commercial city would arise" at the Mesurado or at the Rio Nunez. Harper described the Rio Nunez as having a "principal chief [John Pearce?]" who exercised significant control from its mouth "and far into the interior," who was

35 See numerous letters of 1816 and 1817 in Harris, Paul Cuffe, Ch. 4.

36 ACS, First Annual Report ... 1818, 11-12. For the activities of Mills and Burgess, see West, Back to Africa, 101-103. Governor McCarthy, in CO267/47/128, 2 January 1818, reported that extensive smuggling of American goods was then operating out of the Iles de Los. A few months later, McCarthy disclosed that one resident trader on the Iles de Los had died and another was preparing to return to England, effectively leaving the islands to Americans whom he thought were prepared to purchase the islands from the remaining trader (CO267/47/144, 9 May 1818, and CO267/47/156, 20 July 1818). McCarthy indicated that he had informed Mills and Burgess of his opposition to American settlement on the islands and that Mills and Burgess told him of Boston and New York interests whom they would contact about the islands. In consequence, McCarthy quickly negotiated a treaty of cession with Mongé Demba, ruler of Baga-Kaloum and recognized owner of the islands. This treaty was signed on 6 July 1818. Peter McLachlan wrote: "The attaching them to our other possessions on the coast, was certainly a measure of the soundest policy; for, besides extending the British influence in Africa, and advancing the interests of the merchants engaged in a legitimate commerce, it afforded greater facilities for promoting the philanthropic views of the abolitionists, and at the same time excluded the Americans, and other foreign nations, from participating in the lucrative trade of this part of the coast." McLachlan, Travels into the Baga & Soosoo Countries in 1821, 2nd ed., ed. Bruce L. Mouser and Ramon Sarro (Leipzig: University of Leipzig Papers on Africa, No. 2, 1999), 29.

37 ACS, First Annual Report ... 1818, "Letter from General Harper to Elias Caldwell, August 20, 1817," 14-18. A corrected and elaborated version of this letter was printed separately as Gen. [Robert G.] Harper, A Letter from Gen. Harper of Maryland to Elias B. Caldwell (Baltimore, 1818). Whether the British were aware of this letter or its contents is unclear in the sources.
“a man of sense and abilities, of a mild and humane character, and favourably disposed towards the whites, especially the Americans,” and who spoke English “perfectly well.” Additionally, the Rio Grande and Rio Pongo were nearby. Circumstances after 1820, however, led the Society to focus on the area to the south of Freetown instead. For a short time in 1820–1821, African-American settlers from the Society did live in Freetown, before the Society arranged for their permanent settlement at Cape Mesurado.

What particularly attracted British attention to American activities in the Rio Pongo in the mid-1820s, however, were two circumstances. One involved frequent reports from British-friendly merchants in the Pongo and Nunez that Americans were fighting for control of commerce and that British interests might be endangered. The second surrounded the visit by Jehudi Ashmun, American Colonization Society’s principal agent at Monrovia, to Freetown in July 1827. General Neil Campbell, governor of the Sierra Leone Colony from August 1825 to August 1827, had gained fame during the Napoleonic Period. Not ready to permit a disorganized imperial structure or American designs in West Africa to soil his reputation, Campbell had attempted to bring persons and places under his control when he became governor in 1825. When informed by Michael Proctor, a British merchant on the Iles de Los who also had commercial interests in both the Pongo and Nunez rivers, that trade wars in the Pongo in 1823–1825 had occurred as a consequence of American intrigue and that an arrangement between Baltimore and Pongo/Nunez traders might be in the offing, Campbell had responded aggressively. Campbell notified London that Nunez-based and Pongo-based traders were importing products directly from suppliers in the U.S. and were smuggling them in without paying the appropriate taxes. Such a charge was not new; Americans and local traders with access to American goods had successfully avoided British duties and regulations for decades. Early in July 1826 Campbell, at Proctor’s urging, recommended that detachments be placed at the mouths of both the Pongo and Nunez rivers, arguing that their presence would stop slave trading in the area and no doubt smuggling.

Clearly Campbell understood the American influence in the Pongo as more than purely commercial; rather, he noted that a British “occupation [of the mouths of the rivers] for the purpose of preventing the Slave trade will afford a prepon-

---

38 Ibid. If Harper was identifying John Pearce, the latter certainly was not “of a mild and humane character.” Pearce was known as ruthless in obtaining his objectives in the river and was a notorious slave trader in his own right.


40 Fyfe, History of Sierra Leone, 159–63.

41 CO267/81/112, Campbell to Bathurst, 14 March 1827; CO267/82/Confidential, Campbell to Goderich, 28 July 1827 and enclosures. Fyfe, History of Sierra Leone, 159, characterized Campbell’s correspondences with London as often “copious.”
derating influence over every other European or American Power, and will prevent them from effecting a National occupation through the intrigues of Liberia." To affect such a neutralization, if not outright cession in the Rio Pongo to Britain, Campbell obtained a written agreement through Proctor with several important chiefs and traders to the effect that the Pongo would remain open to trade with all nationals or strangers and that they, the signatories, wished "to be on terms of the most sincere friendship and free intercourse with him [Campbell] and with the Colony of Sierra Leone and Mr. M. Proctor of the Isles de Loss is requested to convey these sentiments to His Excellency."43

Jehudi Ashmun’s forty-eight-hour visit to Freetown in 1827, his brief discussions with officials at the colony, and his subsequent excursion to the Rio Pongo and Rio Nunez, therefore, did little to relieve Campbell of these apprehensions.44 Apparently ignorant of Campbell’s actions with respect to the Pongo, Ashmun interpreted discussions and events at Freetown differently. Ashmun reported that he and Campbell had discussed directly the fact that goods of British manufacture were allowed to pass tax-free into the Society’s settlement at Cape Mesurado and that he and Campbell came, he believed, to some accommodation. In Ashmun’s account, Campbell expressed a desire that “this liberality would be reciprocated by the Government of Sierra Leone,” although Campbell noted that American goods entering British possessions were required by law to be carried on British-registered vessels: 45 Ashmun recollected that several letters passed between himself and Campbell, that he had exerted significant effort to explain that Liberia was not a colony of the United States, and, therefore, that agreements with Liberia should not be treated as an extension of agreements between the United States and Britain.46 In his report to the Colonial Office, Campbell enclosed a copy of a letter from Ashmun to a Captain John Smith, a British subject, in which Ashmun had warned Smith against purchasing an island at the mouth of Junk River because that was within an American sphere.47 Clearly, Campbell was interested in such contradictions, and he was certain of American objectives.

42 CO267/82 Confidential, Campbell to Goderich, 28 July 1827.
44 The most complete, but biased, description of Ashmun’s visit in Freetown and with Campbell is found in Gurley, Life of Jehudi Ashmun, 338–54. A brief comment in Alexander, A History of African Colonization, 227, mentions Ashmun’s visit to Freetown. The annual reports of the ACS suggest that Ashmun kept a diary while on the coast and that he submitted a report of his visits to Freetown, Rio Pongo, and Rio Nunez. Indeed, Gurley’s version indicates that such a report did exist. I have been unable, however, to locate either of these documents.
47 Michael Proctor to Campbell, 30 June 1827, enclose in CO267/82 Confidential, Campbell to Goderich, 28 July 1827.
After his Freetown visit, Ashmun proceeded to the Pongo and later described the river and its commerce in a report to the Society. He characterized the natural harbor in the upper reaches of the river as a major asset, though any vessel entering the river would risk tearing its bottom on reefs offshore. He observed that the local population and outsiders had already developed zones of settlement and well-defined tenancy arrangements and that chiefs had joined, supposedly, in the 1820 request for settlers. Supplies of food goods were plentiful there, better than at Cape Mesurado. Ashmun also suggested that the Pongo was centrally placed for the Colonization Society’s future designs in West Africa, and noted that land had already been cleared for agriculture, a task that still needed to be accomplished at Cape Mesurado. On the negative side, Ashmun listed three issues. (1) Was it better to divide the Society’s efforts and possibly endanger its total success? (2) Would expansion into the Pongo risk the opposition of “foreign Governments,” that is the British? (3) Could a settlement of African-Americans thrive amid a system of plantation slavery?48

Once Ashmun left the Pongo in 1827, however, a forceful British intervention in events unfolding along the river coincided with a concurrent shift in trader/headmen alliances, with Faber, Curtis, and Ormond joining forces against Lightburn and his allies. Clearly, a swing toward a more visible and openly British affiliation and away from an American promise of an exclusive and closed relationship with a single group of American commodity buyers occurred in 1827–1828. Much of the change resulted from continued conflict and subsequent palaver agreements. Lightburn and Wilkinson retained their positions as important traders, but they too had adjusted to expanding British markets and the increased vigilance of the Anti-Slave Trade Squadron. Plantation agriculture and companion slave trading in the Pongo continued into the 1840s, but the latter became riskier each year and the former became more profitable as trees planted in the mid-1820s became mature enough to bear a good coffee crop and peanut culture expanded along the coast.49

Despite these setbacks and the uncertainty of trading partners in the rivers, Baltimoreans continued to demonstrate a strong interest in the Rio Pongo and along this section of coast, but a new focus came with the expression of new voices. The principal proponents in Baltimore or of Baltimore experience had changed; Elisha Tyson died in 1824, General Robert Goodloe Harper in 1825, and Jehudi Ashmun in 1828.50 In effect those proponents of the earlier schemes on the American side were removed by death. In their stead, two new advocates emerged within the Baltimore-led Maryland Colonization Society. Charles Carroll Harper and John H. B. Latrobe brought different emphases to Baltimore’s activities in

western Africa and an even grander scheme involving the rivers. If the Rio Pongo or the Rio Nunez represented insecure investment areas and unlikely locations for the settlement of significant numbers of free or freed African-Americans, perhaps planners could subsume both rivers within another, larger (and Society-based) plan for settlement and American influence along the coast.

Harper and Latrobe were encouraged in their thinking by better information about Africa and by the emergence of new commodities available for trade from the continent. Both men remained loyal to General Harper's view that the gradual and systematic reduction of slavery in the United States through philanthropy or purchase and the removal of free and freed African-Americans from the American republic were the ultimate solutions to America's slavery problem. In the meantime, however, opposition to total and involuntary emigration had increased significantly within the Society and within the free African-American community. In addition, different objectives within the American Colonization Society between those in the northern states who supported colonization as a way to expand civilization, commerce, and Christianity in Africa and supporters in the southern states who saw colonization as a way to rid the country of unwanted African-Americans were becoming more pronounced. Of particular concern to Harper and Latrobe, and to those supporting emigration, were published reports that African-Americans within the United States were increasing at a rate of 52,000 persons per annum. This figure suggested that it would be impossible, at the then rate of emigration to Liberia, for there ever to be complete removal from the republic. The answer was a simple one: the Society needed more settlement locations on the African coast, enough to receive annually no less than the annual natural increase in the United States.

Late in 1827, Latrobe had proposed that the American Colonization Society investigate the possibility of adding Cape Palmas on the Grain Coast and the island of Bulama, at the mouth of the Rio Grande, as sites for settlement, creating anchors for an Americo-African state extending from Gambia to Cape Palmas on the Windward Coast. Latrobe aggressively suggested that:

Between Bulama and Liberia, is the colony of Sierra Leone, which the utter impossibility of sustaining, unless at a great expense of life, will ultimately cause the British to abandon—and which, even if it is not abandoned, must become a part of the America-African nation, as the increasing settlements of Liberia and Bulama enclose and embrace it. Once firmly fixed on the waters of the Rio Grande, we may deem ourselves in possession of those [mouths] of the Senegal and the Gambia; having dependant on our trade the nations near the head of the Niger; and, if the supposition as to the course of the St. Paul's be correct, enjoying an easy

---

51 Charles Carroll Harper, son of General Harper, was a successful lawyer in South Carolina who participated in discussions between his father and Latrobe in the early 1820s. Staudenraus, *African Colonization Movement*, 110–111, suggested that the Maryland Society was reorganized in 1827 under the leadership of Latrobe and Harper, clearly implying that Harper was more than a silent partner.

52 ACS, Eleventh Annual Report ... 1828, 7–13.
inland water communication with the present capital [Monrovia] of our possessions. From the Senegal to Cape Palmas will then be our own; and we have only to cast our eyes upon the map to see the admirable frontier, which will be thus formed for our possessions,—a frontier including the mouths of the rivers Gambia, Rio Grande, Nunes, and Pongos, Sierra Leone, Cape Mount, Liberia, and last and among the most important, the Kroo nation, the native seamen of Africa,—a frontier easy of access from this country [United States], and affording in its rivers, roadsteds, and harbors, facilities for the most extensive commerce.... Where is the flag of England? It waves still at Sierra Leone; but that Colony is one great lazaretto [leprosarium] for the Europeans who visit it.... The simple facts of the independent existence of a civilized [Americo-African] nation of coloured people, on the coast of Africa, enjoying the fulness of virtuous liberty, governed by their own laws, administered by their own kind; and the abject state, in which the same race continues in this country, will cause the present stream of emigration to swell into a mighty and resistless torrent, sweeping on across the Atlantic; and the facilities of transportation afforded by the immense commerce, which must one day exist between the [Americo-African nation and United States] countries, will almost unaided bring about the great end of our labours. The Northern negro will find a home at Bulama; he from the Middle States will settle on the St. Pauls’ [Mesurado]; and the Southern slave, enfranchised by the liberal philanthropy of his master, will regain his father’s home in the neighbourhood of Cape Palmas.—Then, Sir, shall we have accomplished our scheme, and with the blessing of the Almighty, have rendered unto Africa that which is Africa’s.53

Latrobe appealed to northerners with the suggestion that slave trading along this coast had already been dealt a fatal blow by the successes of the Royal Anti-Slavery Squadron and that the coast was now open to commerce, civilization, and evangelism as never before. To southerners, his plan promised an expanded home for repatriated African-Americans that would eventually remove all free African-Americans from the republic.

For a moment, it appeared that Latrobe’s grand plan to join the objectives of emigration, colonization, commerce, and evangelism and to relieve pressures building within the Society might actually receive a test. The Society agreed to his request for a study, and circumstances were developing in the U.S. that might ease its implementation.54 The State of Maryland, for instance, had passed a bill in


54 ACS, Eleventh Annual Report ... 1828, 13.
1827 that appropriated $1,000 per annum to transport free African-Americans to Liberia, the first of many that might follow its lead. Perhaps even more important was the discovery of a slave in the state of Mississippi named Abd al-Rahman Ibrahima who claimed to be the “favored” son of Alimaami Ibrahima Sori, ruler (1751-1761, 1778-1810) of the Fula state in the Fuuta Jaloo at the time of Ibrahima’s capture and sale into slavery in 1788. According to his own account, he had been captured in the upper Pongo, carried overland to the Gambia River, and sold and transported to the Americas onboard the ship *Africa*. By the end of August 1788, Ibrahima was the property of Thomas Foster who was then developing a plantation complex near Natchez, Mississippi. Between 1788 and 1826, Ibrahima remained in Foster’s possession, married, fathered nine children, and became Foster’s overseer, always maintaining his allegiance to Islam and his lineage origins.

Ibrahima’s fortune changed in the mid-1820s when Andrew Marschalk, editor of the *Mississippi Herald*, a Natchez-based newspaper, learned of his claims to royalty. Marschalk suggested that Ibrahima write a letter to his father, whom Marschalk erroneously identified as the king of Morocco; in 1826 a reluctant Ibrahima agreed to this proposal. Marschalk delivered Ibrahima’s letter to Senator Thomas Reed of Mississippi, who carried it to Washington, D.C., and to the State Department. By early 1827, the letter had reached the American consul in Tangier who noticed errors in the letter and referred it to Washington with the counsel that Abd al-Rahman II, emir of Morocco, had requested Ibrahima to be sent to Morocco. The consul suggested that all efforts be made to return Ibrahima to Africa, wherever his ancestral home might be. In response to a personal request from President John Quincy Adams, Foster agreed to free Ibrahima, with the provision that the federal government pay his transportation to Africa and that it require him to accept repatriation under the auspices of the American Colonization Society. At the age of sixty-five, Ibrahima finally had obtained his promise of return to Timbo.

Ibrahima’s arrival on the eastern coast of the United States in 1828, in preparation for departure for West Africa, played directly into the scheme for an “Americo-African nation” advanced by Baltimoreans Harper and Latrobe. For decades, British officials at Freetown had recognized that nearly all rivers draining into the Windward Coast originated in the Fuuta Jaloo highlands and that the bonding of Timbo and Fula objectives to those of the British would bring significant changes to West Africa. Perhaps linkage would lead to an end of slave-trading, consolidation of coastal commerce in their hands, and open interior trade paths as far as the Niger River itself. In 1794, James Watt had led an expedition from Freetown to Timbo and received a promise of land and protection for any European venturing into Fuuta Jaloo and settling at Timbo. Several British

57 Ibid., 86–90, 97–108.
missionary societies responded to this offer, but the Church Missionary Society was the most successful, with schools established among the Susu in the Rio Pongo. In 1814 and 1821, Sergeant William Tuft (RAC) and Brian O’Beirne, respectively, led new expeditions from Freetown to Timbo, again with the expressed purpose of establishing linkages between British and Fulah interests. A few years later, General Harper of Baltimore commissioned Abel Hurd, a Boston-born African-American with Asian experience, to go to Monrovia and to continue overland to the Niger, perhaps to arrange for a linkage with American and Baltimore commercial interests on the coast. Hurd died after a short stay at Monrovia, before he could venture far inland. Ibrahima’s arrival on the American east coast, then, provided an impetus to rekindle the dream of an interior-headwaters connection and an expansion of Latrobe’s already elaborate scheme to include a new dimension, that of an agency for the “Americo-African nation” at Timbo, capital of the Fulah state.

Others in the North saw economic and evangelistic opportunity coming with Ibrahima’s return to his homeland. Arthur Tappan, a successful merchant and importer in Boston, and his brother Lewis Tappan of New York City were impressed by Ibrahima, who excited strong notions of compassion, charity, and fortune. Imagine what might happen if Ibrahima contrived to open trade between Monrovia and Timbo, or even beyond with Timbuktu. It would strike at the slave trade, it would elevate the Africans, perhaps lead to their Christianization, and it would mean new wealth for the one who dared to dream.

59 For more on missionary activities after Watt’s visit to Timbo, see Bruce Mouser, “Trade and Politics in the Nunez and Pongo Rivers,” Chs. 2–3; Joseph Tracy, Colonization and Missions: A Historical Examination of the State of Society in Western Africa (Boston, 1846), 30–32, 36–37; Walker, Missions in Western Africa, passim.; and Stiv Jakobsson, Am I Not a Man and a Brother? (Uppsala, 1972).


61 Tracy, Colonization, 38; John E. Semmes, John H. B. Latrobe and His Times (Baltimore, 1917), 140–41. In the Federal Gazette and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, 14 April 1823, Abel Herd (Hurd) was listed as a passenger onboard the Brig Oswego, bound for Liberia. Herd was described as a native of Frederick county and a “colored man of considerable talents and good judgment. He has travelled eighteen years throughout various parts of Asia—has been in most parts of the countries of Europe and South America, and now visits Africa to explore the River Mesurado and ascertain its proximity to the Niger.”

62 Alfred, Prince Among Slaves, 160.
Thomas Gallaudet, founder of a college for educating hearing-impaired persons, also championed Ibrahima, describing his return to Africa as a moment of opportunity for evangelism and for the spread of civilization and commerce in Africa. Gallaudet’s vision of conversion was continental in scope, for he believed that Ibrahima’s conversion to Christianity would bring the conversion of his powerful Fula relatives and ultimately that Christianity would spread to the rest of the Fula population. Gallaudet’s dream was indeed even more grand than Tappan’s. According to Gallaudet, Tappan hoped to train “some coloured youths to go to Africa, even to its very interior, to become Commercial Agents, & possibly (inter nos) to induce the Government of the United States, to appoint a Consul to reside, if practicable, at Timbo.” Understandably, Ibrahima’s return to Africa won the approbation of both Charles Harper and John Latrobe, for it advanced their plan to create a grand “Americo-African nation” and expanded that vision significantly to include the headwaters of the rivers that their proposed state would subsume.

Ibrahima’s departure on board the ship Harriet in February 1829, with wife but not his children, seemed to promise significant development for northern evangelical and commercial interests, and suggested the possibility of an expansion of new settlement locations as envisioned by Harper and Latrobe and southern emigrationists. Ibrahima had written ahead to officials in Monrovia, asking that a letter be forwarded to Timbo in which he requested that his relatives provide sufficient funds to purchase his family in America and monies that he would use to establish himself on the coast. Upon his arrival in Liberia, however, Ibrahima learned that the letter apparently had miscarried and that no response was awaiting him. Therefore, he wrote again and waited on the coast without resources. The rainy season began in mid-May, and Ibrahima died on 6 July 1829, with a Fula caravan then responding to his request within a hundred miles of the coast.

Ibrahima’s untimely death brought a final end to any real possibility that there would be a grand American settlement on Africa’s west coast, a plan that rested too heavily upon the successful return of one man to his country of origin. Apart from a 1831 request by Latrobe for a review of his Bulama proposal, the northern anchor for African-American settlement received no further attention within the national Colonization Society. The Maryland auxiliary subsequently concentrated its attention and resources upon Cape Palmas. The Rio Pongo and

---

63 Ibid., 156.
64 Quoted in ibid., 160.
65 Ibid., 130.
66 Ibid., 175-84.
neighboring rivers slipped steadily into a British sphere of influence, as traders there recognized the importance of British markets for commodities and then the French markets that opened for groundnuts in the late 1830s. Declining American interest in the area south of Bulama after 1829 presented the British with a strengthened commercial position in rivers north of its settlement at Sierra Leone and left Liberian settlers to divide into rival groups supported by various colonization societies from the western Atlantic. By 1830, any dreams about an American venture in the Pongo region had vanished.

The prospect of a Baltimore/Pongo connection between 1820 and 1830 represented, nonetheless, an interesting array of collaborative and competing frontiers at work on the African coast in the early nineteenth century. Europeans and Americans had envisioned the African coast as a border where commerce in slaves and commodities met non-African manufactures and where a group of necessary middlemen resident on the coast helped in that exchange of goods. From their perspective, the coast essentially was a frontier of European/American and African commerce. If the actual exchange remained on the African coast, the frontier would remain in Africa. But the arrangement proposed first by Pongo-based traders and then expanded by Baltimoreans and Liberians represented a shift of emphasis in this frontier. By proposing an exclusive relationship, all parties were moving away from the principle of free trade and toward the establishment of extended linkages with distant markets and sources of trade goods on both sides of the Atlantic. Africans or Pongo-based traders would have been linked directly to given markets, whether in Baltimore or at Monrovia. An expanded frontier of African-American trade for Liberia would have moved northward into the Rio Pongo. The grand plan of 1828–1830 would have tied the Pongo region/ Baltimore/Monrovia group to the interior paths through an agreement with Timbo. This would have given the Americans access to Niger paths and commerce perhaps as far as Timbuktu. Perhaps such a plan was simply too optimistic a vision for the time. Or perhaps its proponents had tied the plan’s foundations too closely to the enthusiasm and success of a few individuals. The exclusive arrangements of this sort that were new to the coast would soon become the rule rather than the exception.
A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations

Vol. XXIV, 1, 2001 is a special issue on

Braudel and the U.S.: Interclocuteurs valables?

Contributions by Immanuel Wallerstein, Maurice Aymard, Carlos A. Aguirre Rojas, Giuliana Gemelli, F. X. Sutton, Giovanni Arrighi, Jean Heffer, Anthony Molho, Susan Mosher Stuard, and Steven Kaplan

Previous Special Issues and Sections still available include:

XXIII, 4, 2000 — Development Revisited
XXIII, 1, 2000 — Commodity Chains in the World-Economy, 1590–1790
XXII, 4, 1999 — Caribbean Migrants to Core Zones
XXII, 3, 1999 — ReOrientalism?
XXI, 3 & 4, 1998 — The States, the Markets, and the Societies: Separate Logics or a Single Domain?
XX, 3/4, Sum./Fall 1997 — Nomothetic vs. Idiographic Disciplines: A False Dilemma?
XVI, 4, Fall 1993 — Port-Cities of the Eastern Mediterranean, 1800–1914
XV, 4, Fall 1992 — Two Views of World History

A brochure containing the Table of Contents of past issues is available on request.

Institutions $90/yr.
Individuals $28/yr.
Non-U.S. addresses, postage $8/yr.
Special rate for low gnp per capita countries $10/yr.

Managing Editor, Review
Fernand Braudel Center
Binghamton University
State University of New York
PO Box 6000
Binghamton, NY 13902–6000